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Research Goals and Methodology
From inception, Born Globals with scarce resources face substantial pressure to seek for
business  growth  on  global  markets.  Understanding  how  these  companies  are  able  to
succeed as participants of global business ecosystems can help new Born Globals to
take greater advantage of their external ecosystem environment. Therefore, the purpose
of this study is to gain novel insights into the ecosystem strategies of Born Globals and
to specify the tools that allow these firms to co-evolve with their constantly changing
business ecosystem setting.
This thesis is based in a qualitative multiple-case study involving two Finnish Born
Global firms that operate in game industry. The empirical material was analysed with
help of the thematic network tool and the findings were compared with previous
literature.
Findings
As the key findings of this study, business ecosystems are the fundamental enablers of
the  business  of  Born  Globals  but  also  govern  the  strategies  of  these  firms  to  a  large
extent. Born Globals correspond to ecosystem niche players for which the emergence of
digital ecosystems has opened up groundbreaking opportunities in recent years.
Internal capabilities as well as the personal networks of employees play a key role in the
ecosystem strategy of Born Globals as they can significantly improve the firm’s
strategic position in the business ecosystem setting. Furthermore, the strategy of Born
Globals features active seek of new opportunities, variation and high degrees of
flexibility, which help these companies to manage risks that originate from the external
environment. In order to co-evolve with their business ecosystems, Born Globals
perform both reactive and proactive actions. In addition, they favor relatively simple
strategic rules that allow operational efficiency under the rapidly evolving business
conditions.
The ecosystem strategy of Born Globals was found to evolve towards a more structured
approach along with the firm growth and maturity. Furthermore, the empirical evidence
indicated that their strategy may turn to emphasize stricter focus as well as more
deliberate risk-taking over time. This is because Born Globals become more capable to
manage their external dependencies once their operations get more stabilized.
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Tutkimuksen tavoitteet ja tutkimusmenetelmä
Jo liiketoimintansa alkumetreillä niukkaresurssiset Born Global -yritykset kohtaavat
huomattavan paineen etsiä kasvumahdollisuuksia maailmanlaajuisilta markkinoilta.
Ymmärtämällä keinot joiden avulla yksittäiset Born Global -yritykset kykenevät
menestymään globaaleissa liiketoiminnan ekosysteemeissä, voivat uudet Born Global -
toimijat hyödyntää ulkoista ympäristöään entistä tehokkaammin. Tämän tutkimuksen
tarkoituksena onkin siksi tarkastella Born Global -yritysten ekosysteemistrategiaa, ja
määrittää keinot joiden avulla nämä toimijat pystyvät sopeutumaan
ekosysteemiympäristönsä jatkuvaan muutostilaan.
Tutkimus perustuu laadulliseen tapaustutkimukseen keskittyen kahteen suomalaiseen
Born Global -yritykseen, joista molemmat toimivat peliteollisuuden alalla. Empiirinen
tutkimusaineisto analysoitiin temaattisen analyysityökalun avulla ja verrattiin lopuksi
aiemmin esitettyyn tieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen.
Tutkimustulokset
Tutkimuksen päätuloksena havaittiin, että liiketoiminnan ekosysteemit ovat
perimmäinen edellytys Born Global -yritysten toiminnalle mutta samalla ne myös
ohjailevat kyseisten yritysten strategiaa huomattavasti. Born Global -yritykset ovat
verrattavissa ekosysteemien alasegmenttien toimijoita, joille digitaalisten ekosysteemien
kehittyminen on avannut uudenlaisia liiketoimintamahdollisuuksia viime vuosina.
Born Global -yrityksien sisäinen kyvykkyys sekä työntekijöiden henkilökohtainen
verkosto havaittiin kyseisten toimijoiden ekosysteemistrategiassa keskeisiksi. Näiden
elementtien avulla Born Global -yritys voi parantaa suhteellista asemaansa
ekosysteemin toimijana huomattavasti. Lisäksi pyrkimys uusien mahdollisuuksien
aktiiviseen tunnistamiseen; sekä toimintojen vaihtelevuuteen ja joustavuuteen nousivat
esiin Born Global -yritysten keinoina hallita ulkoista riskiä. Born Global -yritysten
vastaavat ekosysteeminsä jatkuvaan kehitykseen paitsi reaktiivisella myös ennakoivalla
toiminnalla. Ne pyrkivät myös seuraamaan melko yksinkertaisia sääntöjä strategiansa
toteutuksessa, sillä operatiivinen tehokkuus on kyseisille yrityksille tärkeää nopeasti
muuttuvien liiketoimintaympäristön olosuhteiden takia.
Tutkimuksessa havaittiin ekosysteemistrategian muuttuvan jäsentyneemmäksi Born
Global -yritysten kypsymisen ja kasvun myötä. Lisäksi kaventunut strateginen fokus ja
tietoinen riskinotto voivat korostua niiden myöhemmässä strategiassa. Tämä johtuu
siitä, että toimintojen vakautuminen luo Born Global -yrityksille paremmat edellytykset
hallita riippuvuuttaan ekosysteeminsä muista toimijoista.
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‘Strategy is the art of accomplishing more than has ever been achieved before
with fewer resources than one would like to have at one’s disposal’
(Rubenstein & Grundy 1999: 167)
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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1Background
Born Globals; companies that start their business in foreign markets at inception, have
proliferated in Finland in recent years. These firms have been able to tap into
opportunities that lie beyond their geographical reach, allowing them to pursue high
revenues  shortly  after  the  establishment  of  the  firm.  Born  Globals  being  a  relatively
contemporary field of research, the current understanding of this unique phenomenon is
incomplete. Although the typical characteristics of Born Global firms are relatively well
understood these days, there is only little knowledge of the circumstances under which
these firms are able to succeed. Given the growing economic importance of Born
Globals in small and open economies such as Finland, there is a substantial need to
extend the yet insufficient knowledge of these companies.
The technological advancements taking place in the external business environment have
had fundamental impacts on the strategies of most companies in the world (Laanti et al.
2007). For industries such as gaming, the development of digital infrastructure have
revolutionized the operational environment of firms and opened up various new
business opportunities. Specifically, the breakthrough of digital ecosystems now enables
game companies to distribute their products directly to customers, which minimizes
their  time-to-market  and  allow  quick  access  to  potential  profits.  As  the  Finnish  game
companies fulfill many typical characteristics of Born Globals and their products have
reached world-wide fame lately, the domestic game business provides a fruitful and
highly topical aspect to contribute to the Born Global research.
Given the importance of technologies and digitalization in today’s game business, it is
interesting to study how game firms have been able to adapt to the gradual development
of such systems over time. As the evolution of business ecosystems is continuous by
2nature and combines markets and ecosystem participants with new as well as existing
markets and participants, the firm must follow a strategy that secures the
competitiveness under the constantly changing external conditions. Therefore, research
that approaches the hot topic from longitudinal perspective provides a unique
opportunity to gain deep, highly valuable insights into strategies of Born Globals.
Furthermore, by deriving from the empirical findings of two pioneering case firms, this
study seeks to contribute to the ultimate breakthrough of Finnish game industry as it has
not yet become realized to the full extent.
1.2 Historical factors contributing to the rise of game industry in Finland
There are several convergent reasons that help explain why Finland became the
trailblazer of mobile commerce and services by the end of 1990s. Initially, the target-
oriented technology policy adopted by the Finnish government in the 1980s had resulted
in a proper technological infrastructure, which was an ultimate precondition for the
emergence of the local software industry. Furthermore, the businesses of Nokia and
Sonera had begun to call for specialized know-how, thereby giving rise to several small
software  firms  around  these  companies.  Also,  the  growing  demand  on  the  Finnish
market turned ‘Finland’s Wireless Valley’ into a test bed for various multinational ICT
manufacturers such as ICL, IBM, Siemens, Hewlett-Packard and Ericsson, which
consolidated the local software industry further. (Steinbock 2002: 8, 59-60; see also
Rouvinen & Ylä-Anttila 2003; Hirvonen 2004).
The historical development of the Finnish electro-technical sector is illustrated below:
Figure 1 shows the rapid growth experienced in the 1990s as a proportion of GDP, and
Figure 2 presents the corresponding impacts on the information sector employment.
3Figure 1: Value-added of electro-technical industry and Nokia as a proportion of GDP (%)
(Rouvinen & Ylä-Anttila 2003)
Figure 2: Annual employment growth in the information sector and in the economy as a whole
(Steinbock 2002, modified)
The rise of software business contributed to the gradual emergence of the Finnish game
industry. Once a bunch of local computer game hobbyists grew up, it was probably a
natural step for them to begin to employ themselves by engaging in the actual
4development of games. Thus,  as the devotees of demo-scene1 gradually begun to seek
business opportunities as entrepreneurs, they were able to benefit from the knowhow
accumulated along with software business development (see Saarikoski & Suominen
2009; Steinbock 2004: 73; Granqvist 2004).
In addition, Nokia boosted the local game business directly by funding the development
of games: although the company’s N-Gage device brought out in 2003 did not reach the
target of revolutionizing mobile gaming, the risk investments spurred by N-Gage gave
rise to a network of mobile game start-ups (Nelskylä 2012). In 2003, the nascent game
business also gained two other significant stimuli: The National Technology Agency of
Finland (Tekes) adopted mobile games industry in its Fenix technology program, and
Neogames, the Centre of Game Business, Research and Development, was established
to facilitate the domestic game development (Granqvist 2004).
A more detailed description of the research setting of this study is presented alongside
the empirical part of the research in chapter 4. Next, a relevant research problem for the
study is specified by deriving from the existing research gaps.
1.3Research Problem
Based on the literature review, several research gaps in the existing literature dealing
with the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals can be identified. These gaps are
comprehensively analysed and discussed in section 2.3.1 (p. 36) wherein the author
justifies the validity of the preliminary theoretical framework. The research gaps for this
thesis are threefold as they stem from the fields of Born Global, business ecosystem as
well as strategy research. In order to demonstrate the call for more profound
examination of these themes, the key research gaps are summarized below:
1 Demo-scene, a computer art subculture that connected the game hobbyists, emerged in Finland in the
late 1980s. Demo-scene is acknowledged as the initial contributor to the development of the Finnish game
industry (see Saarikoski & Suominen, 2009).
5x Literature investigating the strategies of Born Global firms has mainly focused
on the internationalization phase of these companies but do not cover the long-
term perspective. Furthermore, the topic is typically approached from the
perspective of the firm whereas the aspect of their operational environment tends
to be overlooked.
x Strategy  theories  and  studies  that  address  the  firm’s  co-evolution  with  its
external business environment are strongly focused on large MNCs whereas the
aspect of small firms is mainly neglected.
x Typically, business ecosystem theories seek to enhance the competitiveness of a
particular ecosystem as a whole against the competing ecosystems. However,
the  viewpoint  of  a single ecosystem participant has gained only a minor
consideration by the ecosystem theorists.
x As the related ecosystem strategies are created for firms that seek to become
ecosystem leaders, they are not fully applicable to small ecosystem participants.
x If the aspect of ecosystem niche players is addressed in academic literature, the
focus is primarily placed on how these firms can survive in an ecosystem setting
but the factors resulting in performance differences are not specified.
x Finally, as ICT sector has grown rapidly in recent years and there are new
business opportunities opening up continuously, deeper theoretical
understanding on ICT is of great value.
Given the rapidly growing number of Born Globals in small economies and their ever
higher economic importance to these countries, it is valuable to study the strategies that
allow these firms to compete in the increasingly networked, ICT-driven business
environments. Thus, the research problem of this study can be stated as follows:
6How are Born Global firms with limited resources able to operate and succeed as
participants of global business ecosystems?
1.4Research Objectives and Questions
The objective of this study is to investigate whether the ecosystem strategy of Born
Global firms correspond to the strategy of ecosystem niche players. When seeking to fill
this objective, the distinction between a niche strategy per se and  the  strategy  of
ecosystem niche players should be clarified. While niche strategy is  defined as one of
the generic business strategies (see Porter 1980), the ecosystem niche player strategy
refers specifically to the ecosystem-oriented strategies that are implemented by the
small ecosystem participants who operate in the niche domains of ecosystems. Thus, the
latter approach in particular is of the primary interest in this research as it is strongly
ecosystem-centred. As another objective this study seeks to determine the strategic tools
that help Born Globals to adapt to the evolution of their respective ecosystems. Figure 3
specifies the considerations that are associated with reaching these two objectives.
Figure 3: Research objectives
1
•To review the existing literature concerning Born Globals, business ecosystems and
strategy; and present the relevant discourse in a theoretical framework.
2
•To address the aspect of a single firm in the business ecosystem context.
3
•To investigate how the two case companies have managed to operate as participants of
global business ecosystems and co-evolve with these systems in the long run.
4
•To contribute the limited understanding of the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals and
provide insights into how Born Globals can better adjust to their ecosystem setting.
7In order to tackle the research problem and gaps described in the previous section, two
research questions are set up for this thesis:
Research question 1
Does the ecosystem strategy of Born Global firms correspond to the strategy of
ecosystem niche players?
Research Question 2
How can Born Globals improve their ability to co-evolve with their respective business
ecosystems over time?
1.5Structure of the report
In order to answer to the research questions and to the ultimate research objective, this
study is divided into six chapters that follow a logical order.
First, the introductory chapter contains the basis and background of the study. Then, the
second chapter provides a review of the existing literature on the fields of Born Global,
business ecosystem as well as strategy research. In the end of the chapter, a preliminary
theoretical framework is created on the basis of the relevant theories and research work.
The third chapter elaborates and justifies the method that is used in the empirical part of
this study. Importantly, the third chapter provides the theoretical foundation for the
thematic network tool, which is constructed and utilized in the context of the empirical
research findings (chapter four). After the presentation of the individual case findings,
the fifth chapter contains the cross-case analysis. This is followed by a discussion that
addresses  the  original  research  questions  of  the  study;  as  well  as  the  revision  of  the
theoretical framework. Finally, the sixth chapter summarizes the research. In addition,
the theoretical contributions as well as certain managerial implications are provided.
82. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Born Globals
The phenomenon of Born Globals has fascinated researchers for over three decades: the
emergence of firms that go global from inception has attracted attention as the approach
deviates from the traditional model of internationalization. Even so, the literature on
Born Global has remained mainly explorative by nature with no clear-cut theory for
their  unconventional  strategy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  author  was  not  able  to  find  any
theory presented in strategy literature truly matching with the specific characteristics of
Born Globals.
In the studies focusing on business in international or global context, especially the
relationship between a firm’s strategy and structure has been comprehensively
addressed. International (export-driven), Multidomestic, Transnational and Global are
typically presented as strategy alternatives of multinational corporations (MNCs)
(Bartlett  &  Ghoshal  2000).  However,  SMEs  with  substantially  smaller  resource  base
should not imitate the strategies of leading MNCs as they may become vulnerable if a
direct conflict with larger firm occurs (see Etemad 2004). Specifically, as the
characteristics and operational conditions of Born Globals differ remarkably from those
of large corporations, the theories concerning the global strategy of MNCs are not
applicable to Born Global firms.
With roots in the industrial organization theory (see e.g. Caves & Porter 1977; Porter
1979; Tallman 1991), the resource based view of the firm (RBV) has been a
predominant research stream in the academic literature when international business
strategies are sought to be explained (see Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Conner 1991).
Fundamentally, RVB considers the firm-specific strategic resources as the ultimate
determinant of business strategy and performance. Given the resource scarcity that
typically characterizes and guides the business of Born Globals, the RBV theory and its
9more recent derivatives are likely to provide a relevant and fertile basis for studying
how Born Globals can match their limited resources to the dynamic business ecosystem
environment in a sustainable way.
According to Hamel (1999), the new techno-economic paradigm is driven by business
networks and a firm’s strategy relative to E-commerce is a determinant of survival. The
remark is valid for many Born Globals as their business models may have evolved
radically along with the development of technology infrastructure and digitalization. As
a sequence, Born Global firms have adopted unconventional, global strategies that guide
their business in a rapidly changing environment where geographical boundaries are
increasingly blurred or even unimportant. This new configuration challenges the
traditional strategy thinking, making Born Globals a very fruitful theme to study.
In this section we will first specify the characteristics of Born Globals, followed by a
discussion on how these specific features significantly impact their business strategy.
As Born Global firms typically emerge from small economies, we will address the key
challenges Born Globals need to overcome and also consider the strategy implications
posed by their home country market.
2.1.1 Criteria and characteristics of Born Globals
There are many ways to define Born Global companies, also called International New
Ventures (McDougal et al. 1994; Oviatt & McDougall 1994, 2003; Autio 2005; Zahra
2005; Coviello 2006; Coviello & Cox 2006; Sasi & Arenius 2008), Global Start-ups
(Oviatt & McDougall 1995), Global Entrepreneurs (Isenberg 2008) and High
Technology Start-ups (Jolly et al. 1992).
Typically, criteria such as global vision, time before starting to export as well as export
versus global growth are used to distinguish Born Globals from conventional companies
(Gabrielsson et al. 2008). Some of the researchers apply a numerical approach to define
Born  Globals  -  for  example,  according  to  Luostarinen  and  Gabrielsson  (2006),  Born
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Globals are companies that have entered global markets, derive over 50% of income
from non-domestic continents, and are on a global growth path – whereas others focus
solely on descriptive features of these companies. Oviatt & McDougall (1994: 27),
define the concept as
‘A business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive
advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries’
Sasi  et  al.  (2009;  also  Sasi  2011)  remark  Born  Globals  do  not  follow  the  traditional
Uppsala stage model proposing that companies go orderly through a set of incremental
stages during their internationalization process (see e.g. Johanson & Vahlne 1977). In
addition to rapid internationalization pace, researchers emphasize certain features to be
specific to Born Globals (Figure 4). In this study, the features listed in Figure 4 below
are adopted and their implications on the firm’s strategy are discussed in the context of
game companies (section 4.4, p. 68 and section 4.5, p. 81).
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Figure 4: The specific features of Born Globals identified by various researchers
The typical organizational features of Born Globals are interrelated and contribute to the
urge of these companies to begin rapid internationalization. In order to give an
understanding of the fundamental factors steering the business strategy of Born Globals,
certain critical challenges that drive their internationalization are next discussed.
Born Global Feature Identified By
F1 The establishment of global vision from the
very beginning
Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011; Falay et al. 2007;
Jolly et al. 1992; Luostarinen & Gabrielsson
2004, 2006; Oviatt & McDougall 1995
F2 Entrepreneurial mindset and/or
experience of managers
Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011; Falay et al. 2007;
Laanti, et al. 2007; Luostarinen & Gabrielsson
2006; Oviatt & McDougall 1995; Sasi & Arenius
2008; Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson 2010
F3 Limited resources caused primarily by the
small size of the company
Arenius et al. 2006; Casas & Dambrauskaite
2011; Falay et al. 2007; Luostarinen &
Gabrielsson 2006; Oviatt & McDougall 1995;
Sasi & Arenius 2008
F4 The importance of networks and/or
personal relations of the managers for
business operations
Falay et al. 2007; Jolly et al. 1992; Laanti et al.
2007; Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006; Oviatt &
McDougall 1995; Sasi & Arenius 2008
F5 Operation in narrowly defined market niche Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011; Falay et al. 2007;
Dunning & Wymbs 2001; Luostarinen &
Gabrielsson 2004, 2006; Rennie, 1993
F6 Use of unconventional product-,
operation- and/or market strategies
(Also, the product pricing ideology may
differ from that of traditional companies)
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004, 2006; Oviatt &
McDougall 1995
(Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011; Luostarinen &
Gabrielsson 2006).
F7 Utilization of modern technologies to offer
unique, high-value products or services on
a global basis
Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011; Dunning &
Wymbs 2001; Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004,
2006; Oviatt & McDougall 1995; Rennie 1993
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2.1.2 Challenges affecting the strategy formulation of Born Globals
Limited resources were identified as one of the key characteristics of Born Globals in
the previous section. However, remarkable variation in terms of the availability of
external resources as well as other business conditions of Born Globals exists, as many
of these variables are specific to the firm’s home market. This section identifies the
main  challenges  that  shape  the  strategies  of  Born  Globals  in  the  context  of  small
economies such as Finland. In addition, as Born Globals typically target global markets,
the aspect of product distribution is elaborated.
2.1.2.1 Challenges posed by the home market
There are several reasons why start-ups originating in small economies are facing a
particular pressure to start international operations before or along with domestic
business. Within the time frame 1985-2002, the domestic period of 89 Finnish Born
Globals averaged 2.1 years after which the business activities were started to globalize
(Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2006).
Evidently, given that Born Globals typically operate in a market niche (section 2.1.1, p.
9) the small size of home market makes it difficult to grow on a domestic scale alone.
Thus,  the  need  to  reach  the  critical  mass  is  likely  to  push  these  companies  to  target  a
global customer base at early stage. In addition to the push factor, Luostarinen and
Gabrielsson (2004) note the substantial demand entailed by global markets may act as a
pull factor for business expansion. Consequently, the liability of foreignness – the
additional costs of doing business abroad that result in competitive disadvantage against
local  firms  (Hymer  1976;  Zaheer  1995)  -  is  acknowledged  as  a  typical  challenge  of
Born Globals from small economies (see e.g. Arenius et al. 2006; Sasi & Arenius 2008).
The author would like to remark that although the liability of foreignness is not caused
by the home market as such, the market likely contributes to the rise of this liability as
the conditions in small economies (e.g. the push factor) put the ultimate pressure on
Born Globals to internationalize rapidly.
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The scarcity of resources was identified as a major challenge of Born Globals in section
2.1.1 (p. 9). Luostarinen & Gabrielsson (2006) found insufficient revenue flows, lacking
trust  from the partner side as well  as underestimated sales and marketing resources as
typical challenges of Born Global firms. Specifically, there is a weak availability of
money from venture capital firms; and even non-availability of money from banks for
Born Globals in Finland (Ibid). In comparison with technology start-ups in Israel, Sasi
et al. (2009: 129) observed the Finnish new ventures facing more difficulties with
resource acquire from their business network. Falay et al. (2007) studied design-
intensive Finnish Born Globals and found them suffering from both small market
volume and limited financial resources in their home market. Consequently, companies
need to seek alternative options to finance their operations, and these options lie more
frequently on global markets.
2.1.2.2 The challenge of global market access
Jolly et al. (1992) identifies market access as a major challenge when a global strategy
is sought to be executed. New ventures usually lack the infrastructure required for
managing scattered operations from a distance (Isenberg 2008; Lin 2009). Because
start-ups typically rely on a single product in the beginning, the development of
distribution channel or -network tends to be costly (Jolly et al. 1992). Luostarinen and
Gabrielsson (2006) note conventional single sales channels (both direct and indirect) are
impractical for Born Globals: as these companies and their products are often unknown,
the middlemen of indirect sales channels are reluctant to make sufficient marketing
investments. On the other hand, the limited resources prevent Born Globals from setting
up  a  direct  sales  channel  on  their  own.  This  is  why  Born  Globals  seek  to  establish
multiple sales channels (dual and hybrid) at  the early stage of business or utilize them
from the very beginning. The location of the lead customer often dictates the foreign
markets  a  Born  Global  chooses  to  enter.  (Luostarinen  & Gabrielsson  2006)  However,
Isenberg (2008) remarks the management of such supply networks is complex for
global start-ups. Figure 5 summarizes the challenges of Born Globals identified in this
section.
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Figure 5: Challenges of Born Globals
Contributed by the challenges listed above, the role of networks and business relations
has been discovered significant to Born Globals: Sasi & Arenius (2008) note these firms
may own only the core resources and utilize their business network as a source of
complementary resources (see also Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006). Similarly,
Gabrielsson and Kirpalani (2004) identify four channels Born Globals can utilize during
their internationalization: (1) MNCs that act as systems integrators, (2) MNCs that
distribute the products/services of the Born Global, (3) Networks and (4) the Internet.
Scarce resources may drive Born Globals to form a relationship with MNCs as system
integrators or distributors in order to leverage their distribution competencies. (Ibid)
In recent years the two last alternatives - networks and the Internet as channels for
internationalization  -  have  reduced  Born  Globals’  reliance  on  MNCs  (Arenius  et  al.
2006; Sasi & Arenius 2011). Especially digitalization has allowed various new business
opportunities for many Born Globals and is thus playing an increasingly important role
in their respective business ecosystems. Although digital environments cannot be
utilized in every business, they have proved particularly important to Finnish game
firms. To be able to operate and gain success in an ecosystem environment,
understanding the contextual key elements and their underlying regularities is highly
critical to these companies. Next, the main business ecosystem theories will be
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introduced by placing the emphasis on the strategic considerations that the author
hypothesizes are the most applicable to game firms.
2.2 Business Ecosystems
The breakthrough of technology has been revolutionary for Born Globals: Rennie
(1993: 48) notes the development of ICT is one of the fundamental enablers of the Born
Global phenomenon and a catalyst for the emergence and growth of these firms.
Furthermore, technological advancements have diminished the economies of scale in
global business, which has improved the relative competitiveness of Born Globals
against vertically integrated companies (Rennie 1993: 48; Oviatt & McDougall 1995,
Hagel III et al. 2008: 83). At the same time, the distribution models of many small firms
have gone through a massive change as the Internet has enabled digital distribution. In
other words, the infrastructure of business ecosystems has radically shaped the
operational environment of small global companies such as game firms.
Especially ecological metaphors have been widely adopted by researchers for building
business ecosystem theories or describing certain phenomena within these ecosystems.
For example, both Moore’s pioneering business ecosystem theories (1993, 1996) and
the keystone advantage theory proposed by Iasiti & Levien (2004a) are built on the
basis of biological terms (see also Dini 2007; Nachira, Dini & Nicolai 2007; Stanley &
Briscoe 2010). However, Moore (1993, 85) notes that unlike in biological communities
of co-evolving organisms, business communities are social systems involving a
complex network of choices. Similarly, Iansiti & Levien (2004: 38) acknowledge the
planning and innovating capability of business ecosystem members as a distinctive
factor for ecological ecosystem setting. Most critical scholars have even argued the
biological ecosystem approach is not appropriate for analyzing business ecosystems
because it does not provide a theoretical model which deepens the understanding of
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business networks (see Corallo, Passiante & Prencipe 2007: 20, 29; Corallo and
Protopapa 2007: 61).
Generally, various terms have been introduced in academic literature to describe the
phenomenon of business ecosystems. As connective threads, researchers seem to agree
that business ecosystems do not have a single reference model, but they span various
industries and are interactive entities wherein the members balance their co-operation
and competition (see e.g. Dini 2007; Iansiti and Levien 2004a, 2004b; Moore 1996). In
this section, the organizational strategy-making under constantly evolving ecosystem
conditions will be discussed. In seek of appropriate theoretical insights that fit for game
firms, the theories addressing ecosystem niche players are being paid particular
attention.
The main theories of business ecosystems2.2.1
The  concept  of  business  ecosystem  was  introduced  by  James  F.  Moore  in  1993  and
described as a cross-industrial system in which ‘companies co-evolve capabilities
around a new innovation’ (Moore 1993: 76). A business ecosystem was further defined
three years later:
’An economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and
individuals – the organisms of the business world. -- Over time, they co-evolve their
capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one or
more central companies. Those companies holding leadership roles may change over
time, but the function of ecosystem leader is valued by the community because it enables
members to move towards shared visions to align their investments, and to find
mutually supportive roles’ (Moore 1996: 26)
Iansiti &Levien (2004: 37) do not provide any unambiguous definition for the business
ecosystem per se but approach the concept implicitly: biological terminology is used for
describing business networks, which in turn are interconnected and form business
ecosystems. However, the concepts of business network and business ecosystem are not
equivalent (Ibid).
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The emphasis of Moore’s ecosystem theories is placed on strategic considerations on
two levels: on a wider scope, Moore (1996: 56) addresses the ecosystem leaders and
discusses business ecosystem as the primary unit of strategy-making. He argues that
rather than managing oneself, the central game of strategic management is shifting
towards leading a community of allies (1996: 57). On a narrower scope, Moore (1996:
83) identifies four evolutionary stages occurring during the business ecosystem
development (Pioneering, Expansion, Authority and Renewal)  and  discusses  the  co-
operative and competitive challenges each stage causes the ecosystem members. As a
new strategic paradigm, the future success of an organization will depend on its ability
to co-evolve with the network of other contributors (Ibid).
In  addition  to  the  role  of ecosystem leaders, Moore (1996) recognizes followers,
outsiders and customers on the basis of their involvement in the ecosystem development
but does not discuss these supporting roles in detail. However, there is also some
criticism presented against such theories that build on the idea of one or a few dominant
ecosystem players: Nachira and Dini (2007) remark that while Moore’s leader-centred
approach matches the economic structure of the USA, the ecosystems in Europe tend to
be more dynamic by nature. As the European market consists mainly of small and
medium-sized firms, the division of labour between the ecosystem leaders and other
participants is not unambiguous (Ibid).
Contrary to Moore (1996), Iansiti of Levien (2004a: 39) remark the strength and type of
organizational interaction vary within the boundaries that form a relevant ecosystem for
a single company. Consequently, the keystone theory provides more rigorous role
specification between ecosystem participants and presents Keystones, Dominators, Hub
landlords and Niche Players as the key actors of ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien 2004a:
68).  The  roles  are  neither  static  nor  unambiguous:  a  firm  may  be  a  keystone  in  one
domain and play a role of a niche player in others (Iansiti & Levien 2004b).
To benefit from the discourse between different ecosystem theories, it is essential for
this  study  to  understand  which  of  the  various  terms  may  be  paralleled  -  and  most
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importantly; applied to small global companies such as game firms. Keystones being the
most significant active contributors of the ecosystem health and survival (Iansiti &
Levien 2004a: 68; 2004b), the concept can be seen as a counterpart of Moore’s (1996:
192) ecosystem leaders. With subtle reservation, also another analogy between the
terminologies may be drawn: Moore’s (1996) followers and outsiders consist of
dominators, landlords and niche players identified by Iansiti and Levien (2004). Thus,
although Moore (1996) does not consider ecosystem niche players in particular, his
remarks addressed to followers and outsiders – despite relatively generic by nature - are
likely applicable to niche players to some extent.
The structure of business ecosystems2.2.2
Because of the case-specific nature of business ecosystems, the structure and
components of proposed ecosystem frameworks tend to vary. Moore’s ecosystem model
(Figure 6) presents the participants and the central elements of a business ecosystem.
However, Moore’s emphasis being on the ecosystem development itself, the system
architecture or role differentiations among the ecosystem members is not analysed in
detail.  In  contrast,  Iansiti  and  Levien  (2004:  43)  view an  ecosystem as  a  formation  of
several business domains which may be shared with other ecosystems. On a
fundamental level, platforms and standards serve as the connectors of the ecosystem as
they define the boundaries and relationships among the ecosystem participants. Platform
interfaces provide participants the access points to interaction whereas standards
facilitate the interoperability between ecosystem participants and technologies (Ibid.
167, 162).
Due to the empirical case approach of this thesis work, the focus of the study is placed
primarily on the two innermost circles presented in Moore’s ecosystem framework. In
other words, the ecosystem elements involved in a company’s core business as well as
the outlook of extended enterprise are of specific interest when studying the external
factors that shape the business strategy of game firms. The outline supports the
objective of this study and is arguable for two reasons. First, as small global firms are
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restricted by scarce resources and typically operate in a market niche (section 2.1.1, p.
9) their primary scope of strategic management may not cover the entire ecosystem but
is most probably centred round their core operations. Second, considering the nature of
global products (such as games), the role of country-specific factors such as
governmental agencies and labour unions is probably diminished in the strategy-making
of these companies.
Figure 6: The structure of a business ecosystem (Moore 1996)
The concept of Digital Business Ecosystem
Touched upon in section 2.2.1 (p. 9), the technological perspective has gained a
relatively lot of attention among ecosystem modellers (see e.g. Corallo, Passiante &
Prencipe 2007; Dini & Nicolai 2003; Stanley & Briscoe 2010). On a very basic level,
the digital business ecosystem can be defined as the e-business infrastructure enabling a
business ecosystem in a digital environment (Corallo, Passiante & Prencipe 2007: 6;
Brynjolfsson et al. 2007). The rapid advancement of modularity and open interfaces has
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thus created an environment where a huge number of players are able to operate directly
and leverage multiple platforms (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 138).
Figure 7 illustrates Nachira, Dini & Nicolai’s (2007) view on how business ecosystem
and digital ecosystem are structurally coupled and together form a dynamic innovation
ecosystem. The digital ecosystem shapes the structure of companies and their networks,
whereas the business ecosystem influences the structure of the ‘organisms’ of the digital
ecosystem (Nachira, Dini & Nicolai 2007). The illustration is helpful for understanding
the different ecosystem components – and indeed relevant for the empirical part of this
study  as  the  digital  ecosystem  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  operational  environment  of
game  companies.  However,  the  focus  of  this  thesis  work  is  primarily  placed  on  the
business ecosystem layer as the author believes it provides the most useful frame for
studying the ecosystem strategy of small global firms comprehensively.
Figure 7: The coupling of business ecosystem and digital ecosystem (Nachira, Dini & Nicolai 2007)
As argued by Majumdar (2007: 185), the traditional ‘bricks and mortal’ business
models do not fit the modern ICT-centred ecosystems. Having this said, the
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implications that the rapidly developing ecosystem environment has for the strategy of
the firm are discussed next.
Strategy-making in a business ecosystem setting2.2.3
While the academic strategy literature has traditionally viewed competition at the
industry level and later on shifted the focus on that to a firm level, Moore (1996: 3)
argues the conventional paradigms and partitions fail to address the highly networked
setting of today’s business. Instead, the business ecosystem should be placed in the
centre of a firm’s strategy-making (Moore 1996: 56; Moore & Curry 1996). Also Iansiti
& Levien (2004a: 10) acknowledge the limitations of former theories: the traditional
strategy models that stress firm-specific capabilities fail to account for the dynamics of
external interdependencies because they build the strategy on the firms’ internal
competencies.
According to Moore (1996: 61), the tension between a company’s desire for
autonomous decision-making and recognition of collective destiny among ecosystem
participants emphasizes the essence of ecosystem-oriented business strategy. Instead of
industry-bound thinking, the business model should be developed to fit a company’s
respective communities of coevolving participants (Moore 1996: 56). Consistently, Lam
(2007) states managers must understand how the internal dynamics of social systems
determine their responses to external stimuli before the intended business strategy can
be achieved. Brynjolfsson et al. (2007: 198) note companies that utilize ecosystem
approach as a basis for their business strategy have gained ‘tremendous success’.
The identification of capabilities and relationships (Moore 1996: 67) as well as
decisions about how and when to establish them (Moore 1996: 67; Adner 2006: 106)
form a basis for ecosystem-centred business strategy. However, Moore (1996) does not
elaborate these four elements in detail but notes that understanding both economic and
social landscape; as well as learning to lead the co-evolution of the ecosystem are
sources of firm’s competitive advantage (Ibid). Two strategic implications will follow:
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first, firms should seek wider opportunity environment (i.e. novel business possibilities
characterized by untapped resources such as unsatisfied customer needs) and second,
they must strive for leading the creation of ecosystem that is optimal for utilizing it
(Moore 1996: 16).
Hagel III et al. (2008: 83) presents the idea of ecosystem shaping strategy and identify
the view, the platform as well as the identification of shaping acts and assets as the three
critical strategy components. According to Adner (2006: 101), the key to firm’s success
is an iterative strategy process that explicitly accounts for the inherent challenges
emerging from the networked environment. In addition, decisions about how to trade
off  such  ecosystem  risks  with  the  size  of  the  market  opportunity  are  the  essence  of
business strategy (Ibid).
Iansiti and Levien (2004a: 145) propose a systematic approach to strategy creation in an
ecosystem setting: according to the keystone theory, a firm must understand three
foundations for competition as a starting point of strategy-making. The first foundation
is architecture defining how the technologies, organizations and their products are
bounded within the ecosystem. The second foundation, integration, describes how
organizations collaborate and share technological components across these boundaries.
Finally, the foundation of market management addresses how complex market
dynamics influence the cross-boundary transactions done by the ecosystem participants.
(Ibid)
In seek of theories that are probably most suitable for game companies, the strategies of
ecosystem niche players are addressed next.
2.2.3.1 The Core Components of Niche Player Strategies
In the previous section the strategy-making of the business ecosystem participants was
considered at relatively generic level. Now the attention will be shifted to the niche
players of the ecosystem in particular. Specifically, the characteristics and the key
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features of their strategies are discussed in the light of the existing business ecosystem
theories.
Niche  strategy  was  defined  as  one  of  the  generic  business  strategies  by  Porter  (1980)
but has been studied relatively little from the perspective of environment-oriented
theories (Noy 2010). This is why the ecosystem approach to niche strategy may provide
a valuable contribution to the previous economic and marketing oriented studies. While
keystones are the leaders of the ecosystems as a whole, niche players form a bulk of the
system and seek to differentiate themselves through specialized capabilities in a narrow
ecosystem domain (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 77, 2004b). The two drivers of an
effective  niche  player  strategy  -  (1)  value  creation  and  (2)  value  sharing  and  risk
management – identified by Iansiti and Levien (2004a) are discussed next.
Specialization in unique capabilities; leveraging other capabilities from keystones; and
sustaining innovation are noted as the value creation components  of  a  niche  strategy
(Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 133). Niche players leverage resources provided by the
keystones and may utilize several overlapping ecosystems simultaneously. Specifically,
they  use  existing  solutions  for  everything  outside  their  own  niche  business  and  seek
continuous innovation by integrating technology available from the ecosystem. (Ibid.
2004a: 78, 128, 135; 2004b) As a sequence, niche players possess an ultimate advantage
in the creation of novelty as their new products can function as an extension or
additional capability of the existing ecosystem (Ibid. 2004a: 139, 140). Similarly,
Majumdar (2007) identifies value creation as one of the strategy paradigms of firms that
seek windows of opportunity in a business ecosystem setting.
The other group of niche strategy components deals with value sharing and risk
management (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 135). This requires a niche player to develop an
understanding of its necessary coupling strength which indicates the switching costs
between  keystones  (Ibid).  Consistently,  Hagel  III  et  al.  (2008:  84)  note  niche  players
must assess the relative strengths of ecosystem leaders and determine their own role
within each committing opportunity. If the relationship between the niche player and its
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partners is tightly coupled (i.e. the niche firm has to establish highly specific internal
assets before it can benefit from the other organizations), the focus of the niche strategy
should be placed on managing risk and dependencies (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 135).
Adner’s (2006) similar notice of the inherent ecosystem risk as a key determinant for
strategy was presented in the section 2.2.3 (p. 22). The main risk in implementing the
strategy of exclusive commitment is that the supported platform fails to attract enough
participants (Hagel III et al. 2008).
Contrary to the model of tightly coupled relationships, the risk of becoming dominated
by the other ecosystem participants decreases if the niche player manages to diversify
by establishing loosely coupled connections with several organizations (Iansiti and
Levien,  2004a).  In  this  case,  the  niche  player  strategy  should  embrace  mobility  and
flexibility as interfaces in loosely coupled systems allow firms to respond much more
easily to the changes in their technological environment. (Ibid. 2004a: 134-138)
However, Hagel III et al. (2008) note the multiplatform strategy may incur costs if the
firm must meet the standards of multiple platforms. On the other hand, Majumdar
(2007: 190) addresses eBusiness firms and points out the companies must seek multiple
sources of revenue.
Finally, the aspect of interdependency should be considered by niche players because
mobility and collective negotiation power brings them influence over keystones (Iansiti
and Levien 2004a: 138; 2004b). Thus, niche leverage is a significant element of niche
strategy as firms may ‘leave’ the keystone if it does not enhance enough opportunities
for value creation (Ibid. 2004a: 138; 2004b). This in turn would decrease the
‘healthiness’ of the ecosystem, which harms the operations of the keystone (Ibid. 2004a:
139).
In summary, sustainable niche strategies leverage the powerful platforms to compensate
their limited resources and seek to manage the network dependencies: the key is to
understand the nature of the particular platform and assess the likely evolution of the
relationships (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 155). Lewin et al. (1999: 538) note the profit
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potential of new opportunities decrease as the competitor density in a niche increases.
Constantly expanding platforms push innovation by driving niche players away from
the original core where specialized expertise and quick response is required (Iansiti &
Levien, 2004a: 155; see also Noy 2010). Misinterpretation of the complex ecosystem
dynamics, supporting a weak keystone; or becoming overrun by a dominator or
dependent on inappropriate platform are the main causes of niche strategy failure.
(Iansiti & Levien 2004a: 11) Lastly, Noy (2010) states niche strategies are relatively
short-range of nature and mostly affected by the environmental forces in the long term.
The next section discusses how niche firms can retain their competitiveness in the
continuously evolving ecosystem setting.
2.2.3.2 Strategic co-evolution with the business ecosystem
Thus far the strategy of the firm has been discussed in the context of a business
ecosystem in its present state. In order to take into account the continuous evolution of
the ecosystem environment, this section considers the strategy of the firm in the long
run and addresses to the future aspect.
Co-evolution refers to a reciprocal adaptive process between one or more elements of an
economic system (Moore 2006: 32) and is acknowledged as a precondition for the
ecosystem’s long-term sustainability (Moore 1996, 2006; Moore & Curry 1996; Iansiti
& Levien 2004a, 2004b). The term is also used in the strategy literature addressing the
interplay between the organizational environment and the firm’s strategy. According to
Lewin & Volberda (1999) co-evolution is ‘a joint outcome of managerial intentionality,
environment, and institutional effects’.  This  section  gives  an  overview of  how the  co-
evolutionary aspect has been addressed by strategy theorists.
Research applying the long-term aspect to the linkage between firm’s strategy and the
external business environment has been mainly driven by the adaptation–selection
discourse (see e.g. Lewin & Volberda 1999; Cantwell et al. 2010). The theories
addressing strategic adaptation typically consider ‘fit’ or ‘match’ as an incremental,
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reactive process driven by the environment (see e.g. Chandler 1962; Lawrence &
Lorsch 1967; Nelson and Winter 1982; Tushman & Anderson 1986; Donaldson 1987;
Taghian & Shaw 2010; Yamakawa et al. 2010; Cheng & Liang 2011). Often drawing
from the resource-based view of the firm and the ecletic paradigm, firms’ competitive
advantage and survival is explained by unique resources and capabilities, regimes of
routines or optimal resource allocation strategies (Lewin & Volberda 2003). Strategists
acknowledge the growing interdependency between firms: for example, it has been
stated the O advantage of OLI paradigm should be broadened to cover the inter-firm
alliances and networks as the management firm’s relational assets is a catalyst of
sustainable competitiveness (Dunning 1995, 2000; Dunning & Wymbs 2001)
In contrast, the co-evolutionary organizational theorists propose that the managerial
adaptation and environmental selection occur simultaneously and affect each other (see
e.g. Lewin & Volberda 1999; 2003; Lewin 1999; Cantwell et al. 2009). Lewin &
Volberda (1999) propose the managed selection as the most effective mechanism that
drives the co-evolutionary patterns of firms and enables organizational renewal over
time. The best elements of the past experiences should be retained along with deliberate
creation of novelty: ‘Rather than shaping the pattern that constitutes strategic renewal
(hierarchical renewal) managers shape the context within which it emerges, speeding
up co-evolutionary processes’ (Lewin & Volberda 2003). Importantly, organizations
must carry out both exploitation and exploration strategies (Levinthal & March 1993;
Lewin & Volberda 1999). Lewin et al. (1999) adds legacy as the third component
affecting the firm’s long-term survival.
Consequently, the focus of research has increasingly shifted to how exploitation and
exploration should be balanced (Kyriakopoulos & Moorman 2004). The theory of
Dynamic Capabilities (Teece et al.1997) proposes the firm’s latent abilities allowing
renewal and adaptation are the source of competitive advantage over time. The best
strategic fit between firm and ecosystem as well as structure and strategy is gained
specifically through the asset alignment capacity (Teece 2011). According to Eisenhardt
& Martin (2000) dynamic capabilities are identifiable processes - such as strategic
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decision-making and alliancing - that have commonalities across firms and thus
resemble the traditional conception of routines (see e.g. Nelson & Winter 1982). On
rapidly changing markets, these strategic routines should be purposefully simple to
allow effective adaptation (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). Similarly, O’Callaghan (2007)
note dynamic capabilities allow SMEs to organize their existing competencies to better
match the needs of emerging market niches. Taghian & Shaw (2010) found evidence the
process of capability configuration is the main contributor to the firm’s market fit,
which in turn correlates positively with performance.
Although mainly disregarded in the ecosystem strategies of Moore (1996) and Iansiti &
Levien (2004a), the importance of knowledge as the firm’s strategic inimitable resource
is highlighted in the strategy literature (see e.g. Barney 1991; Grant 1996; Kogut &
Zander 1993, 2003; Madhok & Phene 2001). Knowledge creation process is also
recognized as a key dynamic capability of the firm (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).
According to Madhok & Phene (2001), the ability to coordinate and leverage
knowledge related-resources as well as the management of network-level knowledge-
sharing processes are the key co-evolutionary processes that enhance firm
competitiveness. Absorptive capacity –  or market sensing (Cravens et al. 2009) - is
acknowledged as a mean for a firm to utilize its external network relationships for
knowledge creation (see Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan 2000;
O’Callaghan 2007). As the environmental variation may change the way knowledge
evolution impacts firm performance, the firm’s knowledge evolution strategy should
follow the changes occurring in the business environment (Cheng & Liang 2011).
Lewin et al. (1999) propose high absorptive capacity increases the firm’s likelihood to
utilize exploration (Ibid).
In line with the theory of dynamic capabilities,  Eisenhardt & Galunic (2000) state co-
evolution embraces the routines that allow firms to formulate new synergistic resource
combinations. Lewin et al. (1999) note high organizational bureaucracy lowers the
firm’s ability to recognize new opportunities. Consistently, many researchers propose
strategies entailing relatively simple and straightforward rules for opportunity
28
identification and capture in constantly evolving dynamic environments (see e.g.
Rubenstein & Grundy 1999; Eisenhardt & Sull 2001; Adner & Levinthal 2004; Adner
2006; Hagel III et al. 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Bingham & Eisendhardt 2011; Sull &
Eisenhardt 2012). For example, Eisenhardt & Sull (2001) argue young companies
typically have too few rules, preventing the effective implementation of innovative
ideas. Instead, the identification of a few key strategic processes and unique simple
rules provides more structure and guides them through the chaos (ibid). Also Adner and
Levinthal (2004) remark firms’ seek of adaptation through vague or unstructured
exploration activities hinder them from distinguishing the real option from the generic
notions of path-dependency.
In addition to planned strategies, Rubenstein & Grundy (1999: 9) present two more
groupings for business strategies that are more informal by nature. Generally, umbrella
strategies consider certain key aspects of the firm’s environment, the present situation
as well as the organizational capacity as a basis for strategy-making. Umbrella strategies
are usually written and occur in global context; and they set the direction and main
policies for the firm that strives for a particular result. In turn, intuitive strategies are
often unwritten as they build on the idea of the firm’s ultimate goal as well as the feel of
how that goal is achieved. Usually there is little systematic analysis of the firm’s
environment, the present situation or organizational capacity carried out. (Ibid)
According to Rubenstein & Grundy’s (1999) theory, an entrepreneurial organization
that seeks for high growth benefits from a suitable mix of intuitive strategies (to allow
flexible decision-making when the needed data is not available), umbrella strategies (to
allow policies and directions) and planned strategies (to allow analysis and
coordination). Specifically, ‘knowing which rules or moulds to break and reshape is the
essence of the art of strategy’ and this is  why the planning process of the firm should
achieve a balance between the continuity and change. (Rubenstein & Grundy 1999: 10,
158)
Eisenhardt & Brown (1998) note the organizational change typically occurs as a
response to single events such as shifts in technology, which is often an ineffective way
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to manage transitions in rapidly moving markets. Tactical adjustments made by the
managers may collectively lead to unintended changes to the strategy (Adner 2006)
Therefore, Eisenhardt & Brown (1998) propose time pacing that is a semi-structured
strategy allowing a predictable rhythm for change: a firm can gain competitive
advantage by setting the right rhythms and synchronizing those rhythms both with the
business environment and the firm’s internal capabilities (Eisenhardt and Brown 1998).
Consistently with the logic of dynamic capabilities and simple rule strategies, time
pacing integrates exploitation and exploration by building on ‘clear, choreographed
processes’ that are the key for managing the critical transitions effectively (Ibid).
Process, schedule and the learning mechanism at the core of entrepreneurial strategy are
also recognized by Rubenstein & Grundy (1999: 12). The organizational agility will be
gained through the ability to anticipate change and perform proactively. (Eisenhardt and
Brown 1998)
Contrary  to  the  idea  of  time  pacing,  Voelpel  et  al.  (2006)  argue  the  pursuit  of  fit  by
predicting the environmental evolvement is not sufficient to survive in the long term.
Achieving the organizational objects may necessitate challenging the industry mind-set
as well as the firm’s internal mind-set (Rubenstein & Grundy 1999: 21). While
maintaining flexibility when changes in the business environment occur, a firm must
also co-evolve unprompted by creating purposeful misfit (Voelpel et al. 2006).
Specifically, by becoming misfit to prevailing ways of thinking and conducting
business, the firm can bring about an innovative strategy that enhances its success in
arising business environments (Ibid). Consequently, five managerial implications are
identified: (1) Balancing the risks of misfit experimentation by aligning the innovation
with customer needs and organizational capabilities, (2) Co-shaping new value with
business ecosystem members, (3) Managing the paradox of fit and misfit
simultaneously, (4) Implementing a redefined concept of ‘strategic fitness’ and
accepting the disagreement that misfit generated, and (5) Measuring the performance
through systemic scorecards (Voelpel et al. 2006).
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Figure 8 summarizes and compares selected strategy propositions discussed above and
in the previous sections of this study.
Strategic
Logic
Source of
advantage in
the long term
Firm’s
response to
change
Performance
Goal
Risks of
the Strategy
Iansiti &
Levien (2004a):
Ecosystem
Niche Player
Strategy
Keystone
leverage while
managing
interdependency
Value creation,
value sharing &
risk management
Both reactive
and proactive
Differentiation
through
specialized
capabilities
Difficulty of
interpreting
ecosystem
dynamics, threat
of over-
dependency
Eisenhardt &
Brown (1998):
Time
Pacing
Scheduling
change at
predictable time
intervals
Ability to manage
transition and
rhythm
Proactive Enhanced
competitiveness
Not the answer
for every
business
Eisenhardt &
Sull (2001):
Simple Rules
Pursuit of fleeting
opportunities
whilst avoiding
the chaos
Key processes
and simple rules
allow to identify
the best
opportunities
Proactive Growth High
tentativeness in
catching
promising
opportunities
Voelpel et al.
(2006):
Purposeful
Organizational
Misfit
Organizational
misfit as a
generator of
innovative
strategies
New and
innovative
customer value,
ability to leapfrog
competitors
Proactive Long-term fit The paradox of
simultaneous fit
and misfit: an
uncontrolled
misfit can result
a failure
Adner (2006):
Innovation
Strategy
Successful
innovation
enabled by
monitoring the
ecosystem co-
participants
Systematic
approach to
analyzing risks
completes the due
diligence process
Reactive:
strategy
modified on
the basis of risk
assessment
Growth Not discussed
Figure 8: Strategy propositions and discussions for rapidly changing environments (selected authors)
In this literature review, two interesting research fields have been introduced in order to
examine the existing theoretical foundation for the underlying linkages between them.
First, the typical characteristics and challenges of Born Globals were discussed,
followed  by  a  review  of  business  ecosystem  theories  with  emphasis  on  their  strategic
implications for a single ecosystem participant. In seek of synthesizing the previous
research work conducted on these fields, the classic idea of SWOT framework will be
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applied next. By this way, the author attempts to clarify the role the business
ecosystems have come to play in the business of game firms in recent years.
Ecosystem implications on the strategy formulation of Born Globals2.2.4
When modelling the relationship between a small global firm and its ecosystem, the
classical SWOT framework may prove useful: in addition to the firm’s internal
strengths and weaknesses, the tool considers opportunities and threats that are to emerge
from the external business environment. The external factors of the SWOT matrix are
outside of the control of the organization (Weihrich 1982, cit. Ghazinoory et al. 2011).
In this light, the firms’ external ecosystem may have significant implications on the
strategy of small global firms.
Ecosystem as an Opportunity
The RBV of the firm helps to understand why the ecosystems environment may appear
highly attractive to game companies. Instead of striving for strategic ‘fit’ (for the
traditional strategy theories and discourse; see section 2.2.3.2, p. 25), firms may rather
‘stretch’ their resources because adding them can prove costly (Maula 1999, 347).
Today, the emergence of business ecosystems has provided new opportunities for firms
to acquire resources, thereby making the ecosystem environment especially appealing to
small global operators. When reasoning how business ecosystems allow game
companies to overcome the challenges relating to their scarce resources, niche
operations and global market access (section 2.1.2, p. 12), the network theory of
internationalization proves insightful.
As touched upon in section 2.1.2.2 (p. 15), the need to understand networks in the
context of Born Globals is widely recognized by researchers (see Oviatt & McDougal
1995, 2003; Yli-Renko & Autio 1998; Coviello 2004; Autio 2005; Coviello & Cox
2006; Isenberg 2008 and Sasi and Arenius 2008). As found by Sasi & Arenius (2008),
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the Finnish Born Globals may have access to resources that support their early
internationalization, but global network exposure may be a necessary to reach
subsequent international growth. The network effect brings about collective utility and
thus benefits the ecosystem members of all sizes (Iansiti and Levien 2004b; Nachira et
al. 2007: 4). The aspect of social capital is often highlighted by network theorists: for
example, Dunning (2000) states social capital is directly related to firms’ relational
assets, which refer to capabilities to access, sustain and upgrade economically beneficial
relationships. Specifically, firm’s access to such resources is becoming more important
that the actual ownership (Barney 1991; Dunning 2000; Coviello & Cox 2006; Cantwell
et al. 2010).
The digital distribution enabled by business ecosystems has been a crucial catalyst for
the  competitiveness  of  game firms:  today,  their  products  can  be  distributed  to  foreign
countries with minimal additional cost per unit once the game has been developed (see
Arenius  et  al.  2006;  Koiso-Kanttila  2004).  At  the  same  time,  the  number  of
intermediaries in the digital goods business has been profoundly reduced as the
companies are able to distribute their products directly (Koiso-Kanttila 2004). The
reconstructed model of game distribution demonstrates the evolvement of game firms’
business ecosystem and is presented in Figure 9.
Figure 9: The implications of digital distribution for the business of game firms (Neogames 2011)
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Along with direct distribution, the entire value chain of game industry – formerly ‘very
unfair financially to those who develop games’ (Neogames 2011) – has been
transformed, which is reflected in the business models of game firms. Such
reorganization and generation of new value chains is termed as ‘value chaining’ by
Moore (1996) and can lead to dramatic performance improvements in ecosystems (Ibid
70). In sum, the model of direct distribution provides a solution to many of the resource
constraints the Born Global firms have formerly struggled with. It has allowed
remarkably shorter time to market (see e.g. Koiso-Kanttila 2004; Wunsch-Vincent
2005) which enables quicker access to revenue (Gabrielsson & Kirpalani 2004);
relieving game companies more resources for fast-cycle product development.
In addition to the response to resource scarcity of Born Globals, ecosystem also helps
these firms to overcome the challenge of market access. The Internet has allowed global
reach (Dunning & Wymbs 2001; Moore 2006), thereby letting the firms to find the
critical mass for their niche products more easily. Similarly, Arenius et al. (2006) note
Born Globals can use Internet for increasing the brand awareness among consumers,
which facilitates market pull. Finally, the Internet can decrease the effects of liability of
foreignness and resource scarcity because it decreases the costs directly associated with
distance as well as costs resulting from the host country environment (Arenius et al.
2006; Sasi and Arenius 2008).
Ecosystem as a Threat
The constraining role of business ecosystems in the operations of its members or
prospective participants has been paid only little attention by researchers. Dunning
(2000) note the relational assets may be also negative of value and take the form of
liability. Similarly, Adner (2006) remarks while easily overestimating the potential for
value creation, ecosystem participants may underestimate the challenges resulting from
the interconnected nature of liabilities. Before a sustainable ecosystem strategy can be
established by small global firms, the challenges and threats posed by the ecosystem
environment should be acknowledged.
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Zahra (2005) notes the liability of newness limits Born Globals’ access to existing
networks. As found in section 2.1.1 (p. 9), Born Globals seek niche markets in order to
gain competitive advantage against the firms with greater resource base. However,
Iansiti and Levien (2004a: 119) remark both landlords and dominators may prevent
niche creation in ecosystems, thereby hindering Born Globals from penetrating into
ecosystem niche domains. In addition, the niche market may become attractive to larger
firms and new entrants (Noy, 2010), which toughens the competition. Also, Iansiti &
Levien (2004a 119) note the intense competition between dominators is likely to spur
them to create and expand into new ecosystem niches themselves. Dunning and Wymbs
(2001) remark the Internet allowing low barriers to entry may cause problems for start-
ups to create sustainable, non-imitable assets.
The resource dependence theory argues that while the organizational survival is
determined by company’s ability to acquire critical resources from the business
environment, a firm may become defenceless against the behaviour of its external
resource sources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Gabrielsson & Gabrielsson (2010) found
the relationships with channel partners have remained important to Born Globals,
regardless their relatively high utilization rate of Internet-based sales channels. Also,
Yli-Renko & Autio (1997) remark network embeddedness is a significant factor in the
evolution of small firms and note the network may constrain firms’ growth. In contrast,
Sasi & Arenius (2008) state Born Globals can engage in resource exchange and still
avoid being controlled.
Especially the smaller firms with little market power may need to take the conditions of
ecosystem as given and adjust their strategies accordingly: Iansiti and Levien (2004a:
134) remark due to the high reliance on external resources, ecosystem niche strategies
trade off risk with productivity. Similarly, Adner (2006) notes that along with timing
and resource allocation; the most important strategic implication posed by the
interconnectedness is a call for systematic approach to risk assessment. Delays,
compromises and disappointments should be expected as various operations are outside
the control of a single ecosystem participant. If the market does not emerge rapidly
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enough, the investment made by a company does not get support and may end with a
failure (Adner 2006)
While the high dependency of network partners was identified typical of Born Globals
(section 2.1, p. 8), the ‘collective destiny’ (Moore 1996) or ‘common fate’ (Iansiti &
Levien 2004a, 2004b) shared by members reflects the interdependence between
ecosystem participants. Sasi & Arenius’ (2008) remark Born Globals can achieve
significant international growth only if they manage to transfer their dyadic business
relationships into multilateral network relationships. However, Telesca & Koshutansky
(2007) argue the trusted and affordable technological environment may be still lacking
in ecosystems, which hinders small firms from pursuing new opportunities and growth
(Ibid).
The SWOT model illustrating the relationship between a Born Global firm and its
respective business ecosystem is presented in Figure 10.
Figure 10: SWOT model of the relationship between a Born Global and a business ecosystem
2.3 Preliminary Theoretical Framework
Based on the literature review and the research question of this study, the gaps and
limitations of existing theories and research work are identified and discussed next,
followed by the introduction of the preliminary theoretical framework.
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Justification for the theoretical framework: research gaps2.3.1
The specific interest of this study being the relationship between the strategy of Born
Globals and their respective ecosystems, the author would like to make certain critical
remarks on the previous theories and research findings. The following identification of
research gaps justifies the construct of the theoretical framework as well as provides a
detailed explanation for its novelty.
Despite business ecosystems having been under relatively diverse research for almost
two decades, one key aspect has been little addressed in the related academic theories:
Although ‘the companies in a business ecosystem tend to have differing images and
understandings of the ecosystem, even in a highly aligned situation’ (Moore 2006: 58),
the ecosystem aspect of a single ecosystem participant has gained a minor consideration
by the theorists. The author was not able to find any ecosystem discourse promoting the
standpoint of each ecosystem participant in fact having an own ecosystem within the
larger ecosystem setting. In contrast, the theme has been touched upon by researchers of
other academic fields: for example Pfeffer & Salancik (1978: 63) and Redwood & Ford
(2012) acknowledge the variation in organizations’ environmental perceptions. Also
Yli-Renko & Autio (1997) note the corporate network identity is formed by a firm’s
activity dependencies and resource linkages. Thus, the author argues the idea of firm-
specific ecosystems is a topic area that deserves a greater research emphasis.
Moreover, the comprehensive understanding of small ecosystem participants is still
mainly  lacking  as  many  of  the  existing  theories  are  addressed  to  firms  seeking  to
become the leaders of the entire ecosystem (see e.g. Moore 1996; Hagel III et al. 2008).
Although Moore (1996) states ecosystem leaders should promote diversity and establish
a critical mass, the aspect of how the strategies of other ecosystem members or
prospective participants shape the strategy of the ecosystem leader is not considered.
Given that ecosystem theories emphasize the interdependency between the ecosystem
members, and niche players are essential to the survival of keystones (Iansiti and Levien
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2004a); ignoring the bidirectional impact in strategy formulation is a limitation of
Moore’s theory and restricts its applicability to this study.
However, Moore (1996: 55) remarks business ecosystems can be also confined to a
narrow purpose. In this respect, the theory of Iansiti and Levien (2004a, 2004b)
supplement Moore’s ecosystem framework in a worthwhile manner as it addresses the
different roles of ecosystem participants and acknowledges their dissimilar strategies.
Still, although providing worthwhile considerations of the fundamental regularities that
may  guide  the  strategies  of  niche  players,  the  theory  of  Iansiti  and  Levien  (2004a)
remains relatively generic. The focus is primarily placed on how niche players with
relation to other ecosystem participants can survive, but the theory does not consider
competition between niche  players  or  specify  the factors resulting differences in their
performance. In contrast, Majumdar (2007) remarks value realization as one of the key
paradigms of strategy-making in an ecosystem setting. Furthermore, as the negotiation
power of niche players over a keystone is mainly collective by nature (section 2.2.3.1, p.
22) the related gains are unlikely to become realized in the operations of a single firm.
Thus, the author argues this aspect of niche strategy remains deficiently addressed; and
niche players should not count on their negotiation power against keystones.
Besides the above gaps that stem from the business ecosystem theories, a significant
limitation can be identified in the existing strategy literature. Specifically, the strategy
theories and studies that address co-evolution are mainly focused on large MNCs (see
e.g. Kogut & Zander 1992, 1993, 2003; Dunning 1995; Lewin & Volberda 1999; 2003;
Madhok  &  Phene  2001;  Cantwell  et  al.  2010)  whereas  the  aspect  of  a  small  firm  is
typically overlooked. As an exception, Coviello (2006) studied the network dynamics of
Born Globals but did not focus on the strategic implications of their network evolution
in particular. Furthermore, Cravens et al. (2009) note that despite great interest for
developing understanding of fast changing markets, the research focusing on strategies
for these markets is relatively narrow. As the current research fails to cover the aspect of
small firms sufficiently, one must be selective and apply the existing theories to Born
Globals with a caution.
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Several gaps with regard to Born Global literature can be identified too. The existing
research work of the strategies of Born Globals typically addresses the general attributes
of  their  strategy  (see  Jolly  et  al.  1992;  Luostarinen  & Gabrielsson  2006)  or  is  centred
round the internationalization phase of these firms (see Rennie 1993; Gabrielsson &
Kirpalani 2004; Arenius et al. 2006; Sasi & Arenius 2008; Sasi et al. 2009; Sasi 2010;
Casas & Dambrauskaite 2011). In those studies, the internationalization is usually
studied from the perspective of a Born Global. Instead, the operational environment of
the firms is little addressed, which is a significant limitation as compared to the
coverage of the strategy literature. Moreover, the long-term aspect of Born Globals’
strategies has been little studied yet. Given the rapidly growing game industry segment
in Finland, there is a call for greater understanding of the ecosystem setting of game
firms. The methodological challenges relating to longitudinal research - i.e. potential
difficulties  to  conduct  and  compare  the  results  -  are  likely  to  limit  the  availability  of
these studies. For example, Lewin et al. (1999) notes the main barrier for such case
studies on firm adaptation is the lacking access to organization-specific time series data.
Finally, ICT being a rapidly growing business sector, there is an urgent need to gain
more understanding on the firms operating in that field. Specifically, because digital
infrastructure has opened up many new opportunities to ICT firms in recent years, it is
important to investigate how the upheavals in their value chain have impacted the
operations and strategy of these firms.
As a response to the limitations of the existing literature identified above, the
preliminary theoretical framework is constructed in section 2.3.3 (p. 43). In order to
present the scientific foundation for the research questions of this study, the related
discourse from the fields of Born Global and strategy research are brought together
next.
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The strategy of Born Globals in a business ecosystem setting2.3.2
As illustrated with help of the SWOT framework (Figure 10), business ecosystems have
significantly shaped the business environment of game firms. While low revenue shares,
slow information flows and dependency on distribution channels formerly complicated
the business of game companies, the ecosystem infrastructure has opened up new ways
for these firms to operate. At the same time, the literature indicates the ecosystem
environment may pose some new strategic considerations for the participating
companies. These considerations mainly concern the ability of a small firm to access
and penetrate into the ecosystem; as well as the consequential interdependency between
the ecosystem participants.
Generally, the building blocks for the firm’s ecosystem strategy creation identified by
Iansiti and Levien (2004) seem to accompany Moore’s theory and can be summarized
as follows: (1) understanding the structure of and relationships in the ecosystem, (2)
defining  the  firm’s  integration  capabilities  as  well  as  (3)  its  ability  to  manage  the
external market dynamics. Specialization in unique capabilities, leverage of external
resources and sustaining innovation are the value creation components of ecosystem
niche player strategy (Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 133). Although Moore (1996) neglects
the aspect of niche players’ possible mobility between the ecosystem leaders, the
viewpoints of firm-specific high value capabilities as well as the importance of co-
evolution at the hearth of niche player strategy connect the theories of Moore (1996)
and Iansiti & Levien (2004). These findings seem to be in line with the typical
characteristics of Born Globals: as these firms are acknowledged being typically highly
reliant on their business networks; and as the strategy of Born Global firms feature
differentiation as well as overcoming certain constraints (section 2.1, p. 8), the literature
lends support to the fundamental applicability of ecosystem niche player strategy to
Born Global firms. This is the ultimate starting point when approaching the main
research question ‘Does the ecosystem strategy of Born Global firms correspond to the
strategy of ecosystem niche players?’ in the light of the existing research work.
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Several researchers have argued the absence of path-dependency is the key factor
enhancing the competitiveness of Born Global firms. George et al. (2004) and Autio et
al. (2010) found non-routine processes are specifically important for the capability
development of Born Globals. The way Born Globals acquire resources and social
capital changes over time and they tend to utilize active resource exploration strategies
(Coviello & Cox 2006). Consistently, Yamakawa et al. (2011) found both high-growth
industry firms and those with a focus on differentiation strategy will benefit more from
alliance exploration, which has a positive impact on their external fit and performance.
In contrast, Lewin et al. (1999) propose the firms with high niche density dependence
have lower likelihood of implementing exploration. Redwood & Ford (2012)
investigated  a  small  UK  Born  Global  and  discovered  their  innovation  strategy  was
characterized by randomness: the company combined ideas from a number of sources,
mixed old and new concepts, and these processes of combination typically affected each
other. In turn, Coviello (2006) observed the evolution of Born Globals’ networks has
both path-dependent and intentionally managed characteristics. Generally, these
research findings about Born Globals appear to lend more support to strategy theories
suggesting proactive strategies as a mean to enhance growth and competitiveness in an
ecosystem setting.
Sasi (2010) and Sasi & Arenius (2011) found evidence Born Globals may concentrate
on multiple strategies simultaneously in their start up-stage. Also the strategy literature
provides some support for diversity as a mean to cope with the rapidly changing
ecosystem conditions: Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) note effective dynamic capabilities
in high velocity markets are experiential and entail multiple alternatives. Given the
fundamental uncertainty of Born Globals’ business environment (see Autio et al 2010),
Aldrich et al. (1984) make a valid point by stating the strategies dealing with
uncertainty should embrace variations and encourage the influx of new ideas (see also
Cantwell  et  al.  2009).  Similarly,  Iansiti  &  Levien  (2004a)  note  niche  players  should
seek to utilize multiple platform strategy to manage the risks posed by their network
dependency.
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As it comes to Born Globals’ potential need for market adaptation, researchers are not
fully unanimous. According to Jolly et al. (1992), global start-ups cannot make market
adaptations especially with regard to their products but choose segments which are
relatively homogenous on a global scale. Consistently, Taghian & Shaw (2010) note the
fit  dynamics for global market segments tend to be similar,  which reduces the need to
reconfigure the internal capabilities of global firms. In contrast, Luostarinen and
Gabrielsson (2006) found the products of Born Globals must be modular and allow
market customization. However, the author would like to point out that as the study of
Luostarinen & Garbrielsson (2006) did not distinguish the different maturity levels of
Born Globals, their finding may be more generic of nature - and thus might not apply to
these companies at their start-up phase but later on. Nevertheless, more empirical
evidence is needed as certain ambiguity occurs with regard to this aspect of Born
Globals’ strategy.
The reviewed theories provide an academic foundation also for the second main
objective of this study to examine ‘How can Born Globals improve their ability to co-
evolve with their respective business ecosystems over time?’ To succeed in the long
term, the ecosystem participants must align their business with a winning direction by
adapting themselves to the ecosystem leader (Moore 1996: 191, 193-194). As the key
challenge, followers must co-evolve rapidly enough to avoid being cloned, whereas
outsiders need to develop durable value adding capabilities in order to stabilize their
ecosystem membership (Moore 1996: 194). In line with the earlier research findings
about ecosystem participants presented in section 2.2.1 (p. 16), this may indicate the
effectiveness of strategy is dependent on the strength and maturity of the firm’s
ecosystem position, and the emphasis of the strategy should evolve in accordance with
the firm’s maturity level.
Generally, firms are more likely to intensify their adaptation through exploration
strategy when the environmental disorder increases (Lewin et al. 1999). However,
Kogut & Zander (1992) remark a highly competitive environment may retard the ability
of relatively new firms to invest in new learning (see also Autio et al. 2010). In addition,
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too rapid pacing of experience can overwhelm managers, which prevents them from
transferring the experience into sensible learning (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000). As the
knowledge and routine-based strategy theories typically rely on the assumption of
firms’ prior experience and established learning processes, one should be cautious about
their full applicability to Born Global firms. Rather, the limited resource base of Born
Globals; as well as learning from heterogeneous experiences (George et al. 2004; Autio
et al. 2010); may incline towards the theories proposing relatively straightforward but
flexible disciplines as a basis for the firm strategy (e.g. the simple rules strategy
(Eisenhardt & Sull 2001) and innovation strategy (Adner 2006)).
Figure 11 is built on the literature review that was presented in this chapter and it
summarizes the expected responses to the original research questions. The objective of
this study is to contribute to the research of Born Globals’ strategies with a novel
proposition.  With  the  fundamental  aim  at  open  and  objective  research,  this  study
welcomes the empirical evidence that may either support or deviate from the current
theoretical viewpoints presented in this literature review. The findings and the
discussion generated by this comparison provide novel insights with regard to the
ecosystem-oriented strategy of Born Globals.
43
Figure 11: A summary of the expected responses to the original research questions
The elements of the Theoretical Framework2.3.3
The preliminary theoretical framework consist of two interrelated parts as the particular
objective of this study is to narrow the research gaps
(1) By  extending  the  present  understanding  of  the  ecosystem  strategy  of  Born
Globals (framework A) and
(2) Cover also the long-term aspect of the strategy of these companies (framework
B).
The elements of these preliminary frameworks are now introduced.
Research Question Expected
Does the ecosystem strategy of
Born Global firms correspond
to the strategy of ecosystem
niche players?
The strategies of Born Globals feature differentiation
through unique capabilities and high orientation towards
co-evolution with business environment; and can be thus
paralleled by the strategy of ecosystem niche players.
- BGs utilize mainly explorative strategies for acquiring
resources from their respective ecosystem.
- Newly-established BGs support variation and multiple
strategies as a mean to adapt to their respective
ecosystems.
- Need for market-based adaptations?
How can Born Globals improve
their ability to co-evolve with
their respective business
ecosystems over time?
- BGs seek to co-evolve with their respective ecosystems
by reshaping their strategies proactively.
- BGs utilize relatively simple strategic rules and
processes as a mean to cope with changes and uncertainty.
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Figure 12: Preliminary Theoretical Framework A.
Born Global strategy in an ecosystem setting (present moment)
The framework A illustrates the strategy of a Born Global in an ecosystem setting and
encompasses the aspects that concern this particular strategy overall (i.e. the main
research question of this study). Given that the company interacts with different
members of its ecosystem, the one and same strategy guides its operations with various
ecosystem participants. This is why it is important to note that the set of arrows in the
framework A represent one coherent strategy of a Born Global: the strategy is directed
to the entire ecosystem and implemented in various contexts by  the  firm.  As  the  main
objective, this reserch seeks to investigate whether this strategy corresponds to the
strategy of ecosystem niche players.
Another important remark is the two-way form of the strategy arrows that indicates the
need for reciprocal strategic adaption: as noted in the literature review, the relationships
between ecosystem participants may involve high level of interdependency, thereby
posing strategic considerations for the companies on constant basis. Specifically, the
capability leverage as a core component of a niche strategy may make the firm highly
exposed to the internal dynamics of the ecosystem. By building on the literature
reviewed in this chapter, small global firms are expected to adapt to environmental
uncertainty and risk through the strategic seek of variation.
Finally, as the organizatorial ecosystem roles were found dissimilar in the literature
review, some of the business ties are strategically more significant to a Born Global and
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require greater consideration (thick arrows). On the other hand, some ties play less
crucial role or may have only indirect impact on the strategy of a Born Global (dash line
arrows). As the framework illustrates the firm-specific perception of an ecosystem
environment, the potential interconnectedness of the Born Global firm’s ecosystem
members is not represented in the figure. For the same reason, the objects of framework
may be out of proportion.
Figure 13: Preliminary Theoretical Framework B.
The co-evolution strategy of a Born Global (long-term perspective)
The framework B in turn illustrates the co-evolution perspective of the strategy of a
Born  Global  and  thus  addresses  the  second  main  objective  of  this  study.  In  order  to
ensure  competitiveness  in  the  long  term,  a  Born  Global  must  align  itself  to  the  future
direction of the ecosystem and co-evolve with the ecosystem fellow participants. A
Born Global is expected to apply a proactive approach to co-evolution and utilize
relatively simple strategic rules and processes as a mean to cope with changes and
uncertainty.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The  methodology  part  of  this  thesis  outlines  and  justifies  the  research  design  of  the
study. The research design follows the structure proposed by Yin (2009: 27): first, the
research objective and questions were identified, followed by the selection of the
meaningful units of analysis for the study. Then, the logic behind the data analysis as
well as the criteria for interpreting the findings was determined. Consequently, the
validity, reliability and limitations of the study will be discussed later in this section.
3.1 Unit of analysis: a multiple-case study
This thesis is conducted as a holistic multiple-case study. By definition, case study is an
empirical inquiry that aims to understand and capture the dynamics present within a
single setting (Eisenhardt 1989) when the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not unambiguous (Yin 2009: 18). Generally, the method is preferred when the
objective of the research deals with explanatory how or descriptive why questions (Ibid:
2; 2012: 5). Case studies are particularly suitable for examining new subjects and in
situations where the existing theories prove limited (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2009).
Developing a theory inductively by using rich empirical data is likely to result in a
theory that is ‘accurate, interesting and testable’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). The
method typically utilizes several data sources such as archives, interviews and
observations (Eisenhardt 1989), which is the unique strength of case studies over other
research methods (Yin 2009).
As case studies can transfer complex business phenomena into accessible ‘down-to-
earth format’, they may be especially useful for firm managers (Eriksson & Kovalainen,
2008: 116). The existence of organizational success stories (e.g. Cisco, Microsoft and
IBM) may be one reason for why many researchers favour case examples when seeking
to explain ecosystem-centred strategies (see e.g. Moore 1996; Gossain & Kandiah 1998;
Iansiti & Levien 2004a, 2004b; Mayer & Kenney 2004; Hagel III et al. 2008). However,
given the complexity of contemporary business networks, normative research
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instructions for related case studies are ‘extremely difficult and even questionable’ to set
out (Törnroos & Halinen 2005).
Traditionally, concerns over the rigorousness of the case study method as well as their
limited contribution to scientific generalizations have been expressed (Yin 2009: 15).
Moreover,  strong reliance on empirical  evidence may result  in an overly complex or a
narrow and idiosyncratic theory (Eisenhardt 1989). However, Yin (2009: 15) responds
to  the  criticism  by  pointing  out  the  aim  of  case  studies  is  to  provide  analytic
generalizations to theoretic propositions instead of producing statistically generalizable
findings. In addition, well-grounded research design including detailed justification of
theory building, interviews minimizing informant bias as well as rich presentation of
research findings in tables and appendixes brings about a high-quality theory
(Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Finally, Eisendhardt (1989) states the process may
actually yield a less-biased theory as the juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends to
‘unfreeze’ the investigator’s thinking.
A multiple-case study occurs whenever more than one case is examined (Bryman 2004:
55) and is a preferred method over single-case designs as the replication logic can
provide greater confidence in research findings (Yin 2009: 60; 2012: 7). Both case
companies  of  this  study,  Housemarque  Oy  and  Remedy  Entertainment  Oy,  are
experienced Finnish game studios and were considered particularly suitable units of
analysis because of their eventful corporate histories. Dyer & Wilkins (1991) argue the
multiple-case method may lead to focusing on the ways the cases can be contrasted at
the  expense  of  gaining  the  specific  contextual  insight  from  the  study.  Still,  such  a
concern is much associated with the goal of qualitative research to provide
understanding of a certain phenomenon or process in its particular context (Bryman
2004: 55, 281).
The multiple-case method serves the purpose of this study for four reasons. The first
reason is the explanatory type of the research problem ‘How are Born Global firms with
limited resources able to operate and succeed as participants of global business
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ecosystems?’ (see Yin 2009). Second, the method allows the study of a phenomenon
that is ‘difficult to separate from its context, but necessary to study within it to
understand the dynamics involved’ (Halinen & Törnroos 2005). Thus, the close
relationship between the strategy and the dynamics of business ecosystem makes the
case study approach particularly suitable for this research. The third reason relates to the
abundance of information allowed by the method: since the topic of this study is rather
unique and several research gaps were obtained (section 2.3.1, p. 36), the opportunity to
gather in-depth data is likely to support the objective of this study to provide novel
theoretical contribution (see Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Finally,
investigating two companies instead of one provides analytic benefits and allows more
favorable conditions to yield a valid theory of Born Global strategy.
3.2 Data collection
As noted by Yin (2009: 118), a case study research should embrace a variety of data
collection techniques. The research data of this study was collected by conducting
interviews in the case companies as well as by utilizing documentary information
available. These sources of evidence are introduced and discussed next.
3.2.1 Interviews
The empirical data was primarily gathered through semi-structured interviews between
December 2012 and January 2013. Semi-structured interviews are suitable for studying
both ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, the value lying in the fairly conversational tone of the
interview which is still systematic and comprehensive by nature (Eriksson &
Kovalainen 2008: 82).
The approach was selected due to three specific reasons. First, as the experiences,
thoughts, concepts and attitudes of the interviewees may significantly contribute to the
understanding of the case companies’ ecosystem strategies (and thus the objective of
this study); interviewing proves a particularly useful data gathering method in this study
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(see e.g. Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2009: 41; Rowley 2012: 262). Second, semi-structured
interview type is considered as a worthwhile procedure because the research topic is
relatively little examined and several gaps in the literature exist (section 2.3.1, p. 36): as
noted by Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008: 82), too strictly pre-planned questions might
prevent important aspects and themes from being raised by the interviewees. Finally, as
the research is conducted as a multiple case-study, the broad outline of the interviews
allowed by the semi-structured formula helps to ensure cross-case comparability (see
e.g. Bryman 2004).
Employees with long-standing career path in the case companies were defined as the
primary targets for the interview because the author believed they were most capable to
reflect the firm’s ecosystem and strategy from the evolutionary viewpoint. As another
criterion, the author wanted the interviewees to be in a hospitable position to elaborate
the firm’s strategy as the topic may be somewhat sensitive by nature. Consequently, the
empirical research data was gathered by conducting in-depth interviews with the CEOs
of both case companies – Matias Myllyrinne from Remedy Entertainment Oy and Ilari
Kuittinen  from  Housemarque  Oy.  Through  these  means,  an  attempt  was  placed  on
ensuring high levels of expertize (for the background information of the interviewees
and for the interview details; see Appendix 1, p. 137). One of the interviews was
conducted in English and the other one in Finnish. Although the respondent of the
interview in English was a non-native English speaker, language barrier did not hinder
the data collection as the language fluency of the interviewee proved to be excellent.
The outline for the interviews was built on the literature review findings: with the help
of predefined themes, the author aimed to ensure that all the main aspects with regard to
the strategy process as well as the ecosystem setting of case companies were covered. In
addition to introductory questions, the main themes common to the interviews covered
the firm’s critical resources and capabilities; network and environment; strategy;
opportunity identification; and future outlook (for the interview outline, see Appendix 2,
p. 138). The interview questions followed the nine question types proposed by Kvale
(1996) and were adjusted to the case context in order to receive the most meaningful
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results. Prior to interviewing, the main interview questions were also discussed with the
thesis supervisor. The interviewees were approached via email and the interview
questions were distributed to them in advance to allow the interviewees some time for
preparation.
3.2.2 Documents
In addition to the interviews, documents were utilized as a secondary material in the
research. Because documents typically have a broad coverage (e.g. long span of time)
and can provide exact information on many events and settings (Yin 2009: 102), the
evidence gathered from the interviews with the case company representatives were
complemented by relevant documentation. This was important for two reasons. First,
although the case interviews were designed comprehensive and in-depth, the small
number of interviewees created a call for augmenting sources of evidence. In addition,
given the purpose of studying the case companies’ organizational evolution and strategy
over a long period of time, the capability of documents to corroborate and specify the
firm’s past events in detail were found valuable. The material was gathered both from
the internal and external documentations of the case companies. Specifically, the
secondary material included annual reports, newspaper articles and complementary
information that were found from the websites of the case companies.
3.3 Data analysis technique
The analysis of research data typically begins during the data collection process
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 128). As groundwork for the actual analysis part, the
author carefully transcribed all the material that was recorded over the case interviews.
Also the notes written down during the interview sessions were added to the
transcription  documents  as  a  supplement  to  the  recordings.  By  this  way,  a  rich  and
easily-accessible base of empirical material was tried to be established for the analysis.
Due to the semi-structured type of interviews, some differences with regard to the
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handling procedure of the interview questions and themes occurred during the empirical
data collection. However, the transcriptions allowed the author to organize the material
into a more easily comparable order. The groundwork was done right after each
interview in order to ensure that the details of the sessions were still fresh in the
memory. In addition, immediate processing of the empirical data allowed the author to
pick up ideas as well as to contemplate some important aspects that emerged in the
interviews, which created a good starting point for the actual data analysis part of this
study.
Constructing either a thematic or chronological case record is advisable especially when
the empirical material of the study consists of unedited data that originates from
multiple sources (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 128; see also Yin 2009: 156). In order
to allow coherent analysis of the case companies, the author used the thematic networks
technique as a basis of the analysis process. A thematic network is a tool that employs
established, well-known analytic methods and presents the main themes emerging from
textual data as a web-like illustration (Attride-Stirling 2001). The technique being
‘robust and highly sensitive’ as well as ‘practical and effective’ (Ibid), it was considered
very suitable for increasing the level of systemization across the case company analyses
of  this  study.  In  addition,  as  a  thematic  network  seeks  to  facilitate  the  structuring  and
depiction of the themes that are salient in a text (Attride-Stirling 2001), the author
believes it may give certain edge over classic word tables or other tools available to
qualitative researchers (see e.g. Yin 2009: 156-157).
Basically, a thematic network extracts themes on three levels: lowest-order Basic
themes, which are clustered around Organizing themes, which in turn represent a super-
ordinate Global theme. In other words, the global theme of the thematic network
summarizes the principal message of the data as a whole. (Attride-Stirling 2001: 388-
389) The author would like to emphasize that the idea of the technique is to construct
the thematic network tool on the basis of the empirical research material, not before
collecting it. That being said, the thematic network of this study presents the salient
themes that emerged from the case interviews in particular. This is why the illustration
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of the thematic network itself is very informative from the viewpoint of the empirical
part. Because the tool can be also seen as one of the research contributions, the thematic
network specific to this study was meaningful to present as the foundation for the
empirical findings in chapter 4.
As noted by Attride-Stirling (2001), the thematic network is a tool for performing the
analysis in a systematic and tested way, not the analysis itself. The actual analysis most
often begins with focusing on each individual case separately and is termed within-case
analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 130). This is followed by cross-case analysis in
which the similarities and differences across the cases are searched for and contrasted to
theory (Ibid, see also Yin 2009: 156). When exploring the empirical material of this
study, the author interpreted the original transcribed data with the aid of the thematic
network that is described in detail in section 4.3 (p. 65). Thus, as proposed by Attride-
Stirling (2001), the text was read and processed through global themes, organizing
themes and basic themes rather than in a linear manner. Both case companies were first
analyzed separately, followed by a cross-case comparison. Finally, the findings gained
from the research data exploration were contrasted to the original research questions of
this study. As explained by Tuomi & Sarajärvi (2009: 96-97), the theories should have
an assisting rather than a guiding role in empirical analysis: thus, the material can be
freely interpreted by the researcher and the literature employed only when presenting
the results. During the analysis, the author attempted to confront the empirical data with
existing theories and research work.
According to Eskola and Suoranta (2005: 180), a study embracing plenty of citations
allows  the  reader  to  make  his  or  her  own interpretations  and  conclusions  of  the  topic
being examined. This is why the author favored relevant citations as a mean to illustrate
the real life setting of the cases and thereby contribute to the quality of the empirical
study (see Eriksson & Halinen 2008: 131). However, a detailed analysis was also
attempted to provide alongside every citation. The citations of the interview conducted
in English are direct in the text. As for the interview conducted in Finnish, the author
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translated the citations and aimed to establish the highest possible authenticity and
accuracy.
3.4 Validity of the study
As Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008: 291) point out, no universal criteria is possible to set
for  evaluating  the  goodness  or  badness  of  qualitative  research  work.  In  this  study,  the
quality tests highlighted by Yin (2009) and Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) are followed
as they are acknowledged as relevant and commonly used procedures in qualitative case
study research (see Yin 2009: 40; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2009: 296).
As noted earlier, the authenticity of case study approach has been questioned, the lack
of rigor being one of the greatest concerns associated with the method (see section 3.1,
p.  46).  As  a  response  to  such  doubts,  the  author  has  strived  for  trustworthiness  and
validity by establishing construct validity, internal validity and external validity in the
research design (see Yin 2009: 40). In addition to these validity aspects, Yin (2009: 40)
proposes reliability as the fourth criteria for judging the case study quality. However,
Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008: 290, 292) argue while reliability is a classic criterion of
quantitative research, it may not fit qualitative research projects: rather, trying to assess
qualitative work with such criteria ‘often leads to poor quality research’. Deriving from
this statement, the author decided to exclude Yin’s reliability test from the quality
assessment measures applied to this research work. Instead, the focus is placed on
quality tests and aspects that the author believes are more meaningful from the
viewpoint of this study.
According to Yin (2009: 40-41), the test for construct validity is about ‘identifying
correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’  and  involves  the  use  of
multiple sources of evidence as well  as establishment of the evidence chain.  Thus,  the
concept bears a resemblance to triangulation, which refers to the utilization of multiple
perspectives as a mean to refine the research findings and increase validity in the
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research (see Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 292). As the evidence of the study is
gathered from several empirical sources and comprises e.g. interview material and
different types of written documents; and as these sources are also used to cross-check
information; this study features the triangulation of data. Importantly, because both of
the interviewees had deep, longstanding experience in managing the business operations
of the case firms, the author sincerely believes they have the best possible knowledge
and historical understanding of the matters that contribute to the objective of this
research.  Furthermore, the individual within-case analyses were followed by the cross-
case comparison in which the findings about the case companies were contrasted, which
helped the author address various relevant aspects and perspectives. During the analysis
the author attempted to foster genuine openness to any empirical evidence that either
supported or deviated from the propositions presented in the existing academic
literature.
In addition to construct validity, the means to establish internal and external validity are
followed in this study. Internal validity deals with seek of establishing a causal
relationship between the phenomena of interest and is thus linked to the analysis of
research data (Yin 2009: 40-41). In the previous section, the technique used for
analysing  the  empirical  data  and  combining  the  findings  with  relevant  theories  were
carefully explained. The purpose of case analysis being to derive the salient concepts,
patterns and structures from the empirical material, the thematic network proved a very
useful tool for conducting an in-depth analysis of the case data.
The external validity of the study, in turn, is about ‘knowing whether the study findings
are generalizable’ (Yin  2009:  41).  As  this  study  was  conducted  as  a  multiple  case
study, the starting point for gaining more generalizable results is likely better than that
in single case studies. However, it should be acknowledged that the sample size of two
companies is still very small, which limits the generalizability of the findings (for the
limitations of the study, see the next section). Consciousness of such restrictions as well
as the critical evaluation of their implications increases the external validity of this
research. Finally, one should bear in mind that the purpose of case research is not to
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produce statistically generalizable results but provide analytic generalizations (see
section 3.1, p. 46).
Member check is another commonly acknowledged contributor to the validity of
qualitative research (see Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 292). In order to guarantee that
the deductions built on the empirical evidence are in line with the original viewpoint of
the interviewees, the respondents were asked to preview the interpretations made by the
author.  By  this  way,  the  accuracy  of  research  findings  was  tried  to  ensure  while
minimizing the risk of any misapprehension with regard to the research data.
‘At its best, the case study report is able to take the reader into the real life setting of the
case but also to the mysteries of the theoretical issues in question’ (Eriksson & Halinen
2008: 131). Throughout this study, the author has tried to consider the both aspects
rigorously: in addition to describing the research setting of the empirical part (see
section 1.2, p. 2 and 4.1, p. 58), the time lines created for both case companies illustrate
their historical development and thereby demonstrate the real-life case setting further.
These firm-specific timelines of Housemarque and Remedy are presented in Appendix
and 4 (p. 141-142) respectively. Also, the synthesis presented at the end of the literature
review  (section  2.3,  p.  35)  forms  a  basis  for  the  theoretical  framework  as  well  as  the
interview questions, which helped to bring the current academic debate to the case
company context. In seek of high-quality analysis of the empirical material the
qualitative data was then systematized with the help of a thematic network (Figure 17,
p. 65). During the analysis, the tool allowed the author to contrast the empirical findings
to existing theories in an organized and meaningful way.
In this section, the author has attempted to show how quality can be seen in this study.
Finally, it is important to note that the author has strived to follow high ethical
principles throughout the research process in its entirety.
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3.5 Limitations
This study is limited in certain ways that should be considered when assessing the
generalizability of the research findings and the overall merits of this work.
First, the focus of the study is narrow as it is delimited to case companies that operate in
the game business in Finland. In addition, only two companies were included in the
empirical analysis of the research. This result mainly from the fact that there are a few
companies that fit in the scope of the research objective: as most of the Finnish game
firms are relatively young, they lack the history during which the evolution of business
strategy  typically  occurs.  On the  other  hand,  the  narrow focus  allowed a  rigorous  and
throughout analysis of the selected business area and allowed the conduction of
profound interviews.
The second limitation concerns the case interviews conducted during the research. Due
to the time constraints of the case company representatives, two in-depth interviews
were managed to arrange. The long-standing CEOs of both companies were interviewed
as they most likely possess solid experience and expertise in the business area under
research. Although the interviewed persons were probably in the most hospitable
position to elaborate the strategies of the case companies, one should be aware of the
interviewees’ potential unwillingness to fully disclose all information on the topics
discussed. In order this research to meet high ethical standards, the data collection
boundaries – i.e. how hard the interviewer can push the interviewees for data (see Gray
2004: 235) were respected and continuously assessed by the author during the interview
session.
On a general note, the data collected through interviews is very often somewhat
subjective by nature, and should thus not be considered as an ultimate truth of the
matter. Conducting interviews with the employees working in different positions at the
case companies might have provided more diverse viewpoints and experiences on the
topic under research.
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As a third limitation, the evolutionary aspect of the firm strategy is neither a distinct nor
straightforward theme to study. During the empirical data collection, the interviewees
were asked to tell about events that date back to as far as the mid-1990s in the
company’s history. Because of the long span of time covered, it is naturally challenging
to recall and recreate all the relevant matters and their chronological sequences in the
interview. This is why the author sought to utilize a number of secondary sources as a
supplement to the case interviews.
Finally,  the  author  would  like  to  point  out  that  the  business  circumstances  and  the
operational  environment  of  Born  Global  firms  -  even  within  the  same  country  and
industry - may differ a great deal. This is why it is not possible to create any universally
applicable conclusions or frameworks for the ecosystem strategy of game firms. Rather,
the purpose of this study is to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of the
topic area that is relatively unexplored but plays an increasingly significant role in the
Finnish economy.
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 Game industry in Finland
In this section, the research setting of the empirical part of this study is introduced.
Since the early 2000s, the Finnish games industry has boomed and games have become
the most prominent cultural industry exports of the country (‘Suomen Pelitoimialan
Strategia…’ 2010). Currently, game business is the fastest growing sector in the Finnish
entertainment industry: the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of over 22%
between 2004 and 2011 is significantly higher than CAGR of the global game market
and can be considered as hyper-growth (Nelskylä 2012; Neogames 2011). Thus, the
Finnish games industry has added weight also on a global scale: it has even been stated
that the ‘next Nokia’ may reside in Finnish game companies (Boxberg 2012; Nelskylä
2012). Figure 14 illustrates the rapid growth experienced by the industry over the past
few years.
The development of games may require relatively little resources, thereby allowing the
game firms to overcome one conventional business constraint of Finnish companies:
given that fixed capital may not be Finland’s primary competitive asset on global
markets, the local game business still has great growth prospects. Rovio Entertainment’s
Angry Birds is a real-life example of how a small-scale game can evolve into globally
acknowledged brand and bring the game firm a remarkable return on investment: the
company is one of the top 25 developers that accounted for 50% of app revenue in the
US in November 2012 (Canalys 2012). Also Supercell’s Hay Day has risen to the top
ten downloads list in AppStore (Nelskylä 2012). In 2011, the turnover of 89 game
companies operating on the domestic market totalled €165 million (Figure 14). Also the
employment effect of the game industry is becoming increasingly significant: while the
industry employed roughly 400 Finns in 2002, the number exceeded 1500 in 2012 and
is predicted to be 6600 persons by 2016. (Boxberg 2012)
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Figure 14: The development of the Finnish game industry between 2004 and 2012 (Source: Neogames 2011)
However, despite of the media hype, the history as a pioneer of mobile technology and
strong gaming culture in Finland, only a few game firms have yet managed to achieve
financial success. There may be several underlying reasons for the matter: importantly,
Finnish game companies face difficulties to gain funding for their business as the
number of investments has remained modest with relation to the industry growth
(‘Suomen pelitoimialan strategia…’ 2010). In addition, the societal subsidization of
game business has proved low compared to other culture sector industries (Ibid). Also,
normal venture capital investment strategies may not be well-applicable to game
development due to high level of risks involved (Neogames 2011). Furthermore, it is
not only financial but also human resources that may hinder the business operations in a
small home country market: the Koopee Hiltunen notes the weak availability of skilled
employees is a critical bottleneck of Finnish game companies (Boxberg 2012). Overall,
the Finnish game industry is still fairly young (17 years in existence) and the local game
firms with 16 employees on average are relatively small by international standards
(Neogames 2011)
At present there are 14 companies - including Remedy Entertainment and Housemarque
- that reach the revenue of over €1 million whereas almost 50 percent of game firms
have turnover less than  €100 000 (Boxberg 2012). This is mainly explained by the
large number of start-ups established in the past few years (Neogames 2011).
Housemarque has been a pathfinder of the business and this is why it is very interesting
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to compare the company with Remedy Entertainment, which also has an eventful
history but has chosen a completely different business strategy.
Detailed descriptions of these two case firms are presented next.
4.2 Background and characteristics of the case firms
Housemarque Oy4.2.1
Founded 1995, Housemarque is one of the most experienced game developers focusing
on downloadable games on console platforms. The company was established when two
of the first game development studios in Finland, Bloodhouse and Terramarque, allied
their strengths and visions. Apart from Terramarque, CEO and co-founder Ilari
Kuittinen did not have prior experience in game development but got into the business
through his personal contacts rather than knowledge or technical skills (Kuittinen
2.1.2013, an interview). As a mission, Housemarque seeks to create ‘novel game
concepts and engaging gaming experiences’ across different game genres
(Housemarque 2012a).
From the very beginning, the need of finding customers overseas was evident as the
firm’s home market ‘was practically non-existent’ (Ibid). Housemarque’s direct
customers comprise mainly large international game publishers who take care of
marketing and selling the games to end-customers world-wide. Over the corporate
history, Housemarque has released various PC and console games in collaboration with
several publishers - exclusive deals with Sony Computer Entertainment on Super
Stardust HD (2007) and Dead Nation (2010) among the most notable of them. The
products of Housemarque are original game titles that are developed by using either the
original content or licensed game IP’s.
Today, Housemarque seeks higher revenue and margin growth by focusing on digitally
distributed games and technologies on multiple platforms such as PlayStation Network
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(PSN), Xbox Live Arcade (XBLA), PC and iOS (Housemarque 2012b). The company’s
first multiplatform release Outland came out in April 2011, followed by the self-funded
add-on titled Dead Nation: Road of Devastation (2011) for PlayStation 3 and the self-
published mobile game Furmins HD (2012) for iOS.  In 2012, the company also
released a downloadable Super Stardust Delta for  PlayStation  Vita  as  well  as Angry
Birds Trilogy, which is a multiplatform retail game co-developed with another Finnish
game studio Rovio Entertainment. (Housemarque 2012a)
The historical development of Housemarque’s employee rate and sales revenue growth
are presented in Figure 15. In the past years, considerable variation in terms of the
firm’s revenue has occurred as their revenue generation is project-based by nature.
Thus, the actual turnover is highly affected by Housemarque’s ability to convince the
publishers  to  invest  in  their  concept  ideas;  as  well  as  the  success  of  the  final  product.
The figure shows how the firm has been adjusting the number of employees
accordingly. Presently there are more than 40 people working in the company, out of
which three are foreign talents (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an interview).
Figure 15: Housemarque’s historical sales revenue development and employee growth
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Remedy Entertainment Oy4.2.2
Remedy Entertainment Oy, a privately held Finnish game company, is based in Espoo,
Finland. The company was founded in 1995 and from inception had a mission to
produce leading action games (Gamersbook 2010). Today, Remedy has grown to be a
developer of action games, game franchises and 3D game technology, striving for the
next blockbuster on future generation game consoles. To realize this vision, the
company seeks to combine the right team of people and innovative ideas with quality
content and cutting-edge technology (Gamersbook 2010).
Despite of relatively long-standing history, Remedy has released only five games:
Death Rally (PC 1996; iOS 2011; Android 2012), Max Payne (PC, PS2 2001), Max
Payne 2: The Fall of Max Payne (PC, PS2, Xbox 2003), Alan Wake (PC, Xbox 2010)
and Alan Wake’s American Nightmare (Xbox Live 2012). In 1997 Remedy also created
a popular benchmark application 3Dmark (originally known as Final Reality), but
established another firm Futuremark to handle it as the company wanted to retain the
focus on game development (Dome.fi 2010). Typically, high degree of cooperation is
involved in the development process: in addition to subcontractors, Remedy’s external
partners around the world have participated in the firm’s projects. In 2005, the company
made a ground-breaking deal on Alan Wake with Microsoft Corporation. Exceptionally,
Remedy  has  been  able  to  retain  the  intellectual  property  rights  of  its  games  when
making the publishing contracts. (Kovalainen 2009, 2012)
The company targeted the global markets ‘from day one’ because they did not consider
the domestic market ‘any viable’ (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview). Basically,
Remedy’s direct customers are publishers who carry out the manufacturing, packaging,
distribution and marketing of the games, and most importantly fund the game
development. However, the actual game players are the final end customers of Remedy.
Figure 16 presents the historical development of Remedy’s sales revenue and number of
employees. As shown in the figure, the production-based business has caused
remarkable fluctuation in terms of the firm’s revenue generation. In 2002, Remedy sold
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the IP right of their Max Payne hit to Take-Two Interactive Software, which improved
their financial standing significantly. With regard to the personnel, the growth has been
moderate but relatively steady: in December 2012, there were around 80 employees
working full time for Remedy (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview)
Figure 16: Remedy’s historical sales revenue development and employee growth
Characteristics of the case firms4.2.3
From the very start it was evident for Housemarque and Remedy that they are to operate
on global markets. Consequently, both firms signed their first productions deals with an
overseas partner a year after their establishment. Thus, the first typical feature of Born
Globals (F1: the establishment of global vision from the very beginning) is fulfilled by
the case companies (see section 2.1.1, p. 9). Also the secondary material of this study
backs up the finding: for example, the game companies in Finland are relatively young
as the majority of them are found in the 2000s (‘Suomen pelitoimialan strategia…’
2010) but on the other hand their biggest target markets are North America and Western
Europe (Neogames 2011). Furthermore, the export rate of nearly 90 percent of
production reflects the global nature of Finnish game business (Neogames 2011).
The entrepreneurial mind-set of the case company founders can be detected in various
undertakings Housemarque and Remedy have initiated over their corporate histories (for
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the empirical case findings; see sections 4.4, p. 68 and 4.5, p. 81). In addition, is has
been found that many of the founders of Finnish game firms possess entrepreneurial
spirit or strong previous experience in the game industry (see Saarikoski & Suominen
2009; Neogames 2011). Thus, also the second Born Global feature (F2: Entrepreneurial
mindset and/or experience of managers) can be seen fulfilled by the case companies.
Housemarque and Remedy operate in a niche market as console games and mobile
games can be considered as niche domains within game business. On a larger scale, the
case companies represent niche players in the business of digital goods. Furthermore,
game business may also be viewed as a niche area of the entertainment industry.
Finally, both companies have sought to differentiate their products deliberately: for
example, Remedy was noted to ‘try to do less but do something that nobody else is
doing’ (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview). Hence, the typical Born Global feature
concerning niche market operations (F5)  is  met  by  the  case  companies.  Consistently
with the empirical evidence, the earlier research work has found the utilization of new
growth opportunities being typical in game industry (see Cohendet & Simon 2007;
‘Suomen pelitoimialan strategia…’ 2010). These findings indicate that game companies
may actively seek new niches in their business.
Finally, the strategies of the case companies have remained mainly unchangeable with
regard to their operations and markets. From the very start both firms have targeted the
global markets but are still running their operations solely in Finland these days.
Instead, certain alterations can be observed in the product strategies of these companies.
Housemarque has moved from PC games through various different undertakings to
develop primarily downloadable console games. However, a more radical change has
been carried out by Remedy: over the years, the firm has shifted its strategy from
developing PC games solely to pursuing market leadership in two different categories of
games. Thus, as the internationalization process of the case companies differed from the
traditional stage model (see e.g. Johanson & Vahlne 1977), the sixth typical Born
Global feature concerning unconventional product- , operation- and/or market strategies
(F6) is fulfilled by the firms.
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4.3 The Thematic Network of the empirical research
As carefully explained in section 3.3 (p. 50), the author utilizes thematic network
technique in the analysis of the empirical research data. The thematic network of this
study was constructed on the basis of the case interviews and will be employed in order
to allow coherent processing of the case findings. The illustration of the network
presented below lays a helpful foundation for analytical purposes. The process of
constructing the thematic network of this study is described next.
By following the steps proposed by Attride-Stirling (2001), the author first established a
coding framework in order to reduce the empirical research data that was initially
transcribed. The coding framework allowed the author to organize the text into
meaningful segments. As the second step, common and salient themes were abstracted
from the coded text segments, refined and arranged into coherent groups. As the last
step, these groups were then used as a support for the identification of basic, organizing
and global themes that finally constructed the thematic network of this study. Since the
outline of the case interviews was built around five main themes (see section 3.2.1, p.
48 and Appendix 2, p. 138), this helped the author to categorize the data and identify the
relevant themes during the building process of the thematic network.
Figure 17: Thematic Network for the empirical data analysis
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The thematic network constructed for the analytic purposes of this study is illustrated in
figure 17. The very fundamental claim of the empirical research data can be
summarized as ‘Strategy is a compound of internal and external firm factors and
required to integrate with business environment’,  which  is  the  global  theme  of  the
thematic network and lies at the hearth of it. The global theme comprises two
organizing themes that represent different aspects of a firm strategy.
The first organizing theme, The Building Blocks of Strategy, encompasses elements
from the firm’s internal and external environment. Altogether these elements form the
basis and general circumstances under which the firm is needed to build and execute its
strategy. Internal components (represented primarily by the basic themes Resources &
Capability Development and Planning & Decision-making) relate most closely to the
firm’s everyday operations and can be managed and organized relatively independently
by the company. In contrast, the firm may have less control over Key Network Relations
and The role and Importance of Business Network as  they  typically  involve  and  are
influenced by two or multiple parties. However, they still play an unquestionably
important role in the strategy of the firm. These variables - for example the firm’s
relations with the business ecosystem fellow participants - may be partially manageable
(through interaction) or to be taken as given.
Because the first organizing theme described above (The Building Blocks of Strategy)
entails elements that shape and determine the firm’s strategy, it provides a tool for
investigating the main research question of this study dealing with the firm’s ecosystem
strategy in general. Specifically, the theme may allow the examination of what kind of
strategy  is  it  possible  for  a  firm  to  implement  overall  and  how  are  the  internal  and
external considerations reconciled with each other in the firm’s strategy.
The second organizing theme is termed as Strategic tools for co-evolution. It represents
the self-manageable components that are established in the firm strategy with primary
object of helping the company to deal with the conditions of its external business
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environment. Thus, the organizing theme can be associated with the co-evolutionary
aspect of the firm strategy, thereby helping to address the empirical evidence
concerning the second main research question of this study. As the salient basic themes
Balancing reactiveness and proactivity; Risk management;  as  well  as Flexibility and
adaptability are identified.
Finally, worth noting is that the seven basic themes the author has identified may be
interconnected and thus present different aspects of a single matter: for example, the
basic theme ‘Resources and Capability Development’ may be one way for a firm to
enhance ‘Flexibility and Adaptiveness’, which in turn may be used as a tool for ‘Risk
management’. Hence, the thematic network illustrated above is not unambiguous but
provides more structure for investigating the case interview material.
Next, the empirical case findings are presented and later on analyzed with help of the
thematic network tool.
68
4.4 Findings on Housemarque Oy
4.4.1 The strategy of Housemarque in a business ecosystem setting
In this section, the characteristics of Housemarque’s ecosystem strategy are discussed in
order  to  consider  the  first  research  question  ‘Does the ecosystem strategy of Born
Global firms correspond to the strategy of ecosystem niche players?’ in the light of
empirical research findings. The related material was explored with help of the
organizing theme ‘The Building Blocks of Strategy’ of the thematic network (for the
data analysis technique of this study; see section 3.3, p. 50)
Resources and capability development
The skilled employees are the key for Housemarque as the competitiveness of the firm
builds on their ability to create and execute game concepts ‘at the level not every
company is able to reach’ (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an interview). In addition, the firm’s
capability to sell their concept ideas to publishers or investors was noted important
because Housemarque needs to get external funding for their projects.
Furthermore, the firm’s in-house technology consisting of game engines and other tools
necessary in the game development is highly important to Housemarque’s operations:
according to Mr. Kuittinen, the firm has made ‘remarkable’ investments in R&D and
technology compared to their size. As the last strategic resource, concept know-how –
the capability to create ever better game concepts and ideas – has begun to play an
increasingly significant role in the business of Housemarque and is seen as the firm’s
source of competitive advantage. As noted by Mr. Kuittinen:
‘That [here: in-house technologies and concept capabilities] gives us a cutting edge. --
It [here: the business of Housemarque] rides quite a lot on the personnel.’
For the present, the revenue of Housemarque is contributed mainly by the game
productions that are carried out through partners whereas the revenue share originating
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from their self-published games remains relatively low. Generally, the most critical
considerations that have steered the business of Housemarque over the years have dealt
with the firm’s financial and employee resources. These aspects came up in several
contexts during the case interview and will be discussed in detail later in this section.
At present Housemarque was said to have no systematic processes or practices
established in the purpose of developing their internal capabilities. The employees are
rather encouraged to follow their interests and engage in projects they have passion for.
‘[Basically], the key persons are project-based. However, the concept designers have
played an important role [in Housemarque’s productions] in recent years as we have
attempted to spice our games by unique concept art’
However, continuous learning was considered highly important for the greater
operational efficiency the firm is constantly striving for. As noted by Mr. Kuittinen, the
firm started to build their in-house technology ‘from zero’ but is today ‘investing a lot in
the tools and technology side’.
‘The process [of developing the technologies] is continuous and we have learned a lot
during it’.
‘We seek to create our own domain, a so called blue ocean -- that cannot be reached by
every company. We aim to develop our competencies to meet such a level and then we
just hope there will be demand for that. ’
Planning and decision-making
Reflecting the project-based nature of operations, Housemarque’s planning system does
not rely on a regular, set planning schedule but is guided by the firm’s new and existing
projects, emerging opportunities as well as changes in their business environment. The
upper level strategic decisions are made by the two founders on the basis of their market
understanding as well as the firm’s capacity and capabilities. The operative planning in
turn is carried out by project teams. Generally, ‘any kind of key performance indicators
are not being followed’ and no formal process for the related documentation or
evaluation purposes has been established (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an interview). However,
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continuous monitoring of cash flow proves important in Housemarque’s decision-
making as it was noted to help the founders determine the firm’s operational focus areas
in the short term. Still, Housemarque’s ability to plan ahead has been very restricted
until recently because the project-based operations do not allow steady budgeting:
‘Very often we face a situation where the project will be finished by summer and no one
knows how the cash flow will develop thereafter’.
Hence, a great call for flexibility exists:
‘We seek to fix the [technology] base [of our productions] and improve it continuously.
The reactiveness [in our operations] stems from the markets and channels. -- We just
have to adapt to them.’
Because external finance plays a minor role in Housemarque’s funds, their decision-
making is strongly guided by the estimated revenue flows the different alternatives are
expected to bring. Consequently, the firm’s concept decisions tend to be made as a
response to the existing market opportunities.
Finally, the steady growth of production capacity and personnel in the past few years is
raising the need of reorganizing certain firm-level activities of Housemarque. Mr.
Kuittinen  acknowledges  the  call  for  greater  structure  in  terms  of  production  and  work
supervision: Presently, the firm does not really have a HR function as there is no person
dedicated to developing Housemarque’s human resources or related affairs. In addition,
the firm’s aim to make an increasing share of future products as self-publications
creates a call for new skills:
‘If we get to make more products as self-publications in future… That sphere of
operations is full of new needs and skills we need to gain. For example, we do not have
any marketing people [at the moment] as the product marketing to date has been taken
care of by publishers. Things like this will certainly become increasingly topical in the
near future. A lot depends on how we will get to publish our products and how we will
begin to develop the brand-thinking [of Housemarque]’
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Key network relations
There are from 20 to 30 companies worldwide that represent the potential customers of
Housemarque and thus ‘enable the firm’s overall existence’ (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an
interview). The relatively high budget required for console game projects centres
Housemarque’s business around well-established publishers with good financial
standing. A small pool of direct customers has allowed Housemarque to build a firm
reputation across the network, which was said to be the main reason for gaining enough
deals to sustain profitability over the years.
‘Generally speaking, the things [here: products] we do on the console side… There is
not that many potential partners after all. The established publishers may have money
[to invest in productions] but the case with smaller operators is more like ‘the poor are
leading the poor’. I mean it is not worth joining the forces if we cannot get funding.’
The relationship between Housemarque and game publishers has evolved radically since
the firm’s establishment.  Mr. Kuittinen describes:
‘When we started [our business] in 1995, the only way to get the product to the end
customers was to negotiate a deal with a publisher who was the [only possible]
distribution channel [for us] and ask them money for game development. The publisher
acted as a gatekeeper for the whole market.’
Today, the dominant role of publishers has reduced to cover mainly the retail
distribution of games which is considered as a ‘very welcome trend’ by Mr. Kuittinen.
As  a  mean  to  build  and  sustain  publisher  relations,  Housemarque  was  said  to  attend
industry events and may make company visits in order to promote their new concept
ideas. Thus far, Housemarque’s two self-publications released in 2011 and 2012 have
not impacted the firm’s publisher relations:
‘That [self-publishing] has been just a small part of our operations yet. And we are
talking about very different types of products that do not necessarily compete in the
same category. But we have cherished the idea of getting to make the big hit that would
finally bring us the greatest gains. Such an opportunity has not turned up us yet’.
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By contrast, the number and type of investor relations has evolved substantially in
Housemarque’s network over time, which is also reflected in the firm’s relationships
with the publishers as described above. Specifically, the funding of Housemarque’s
projects no longer relies on a publisher solely as the firm can utilize alternative
monetary sources:
‘Formerly, the publisher acted also as a kind of ‘risk fund’ that made the decision about
which game concepts will be included in the portfolio. Now the model is much more
scattered: there is venture capital [available as well as] some more specific investments
that may be directed to a particular game production.’
‘However, our funding is mostly based on cash flow; we have not received too many
investments. -- We always need to find the next thing [to bring the business forward]’
As the content for Housemarque’s productions is created mainly in-house, the firm
conducts only small-scale subcontracting with few vendors.
‘The network of subcontractors is not that big because there have not been that much
need for us [to resort to subcontracting]. -- [Thus far] we have created the content of
productions mostly by ourselves’.
However, Housemarque was noted to be constantly striving for the greater utilization of
subcontractors in certain parts of their productions.
The role and importance of business network
Fundamentally, the business network was noted as a precondition for the operations of
Housemarque:
‘The business network provides us livelihood. However, the business field [here:
network] is rather small in our case.’
‘It would not have been possible to establish this kind of firm 30 years ago, right? The
growth of the [game] market and the [business] environment as a whole are the
fundamental enablers of our existence. However, we are in a reactive role whereas the
other players create the market facilities’.
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Housemarque was able to tap into the opportunities provided by digital markets very
early: the firm was among the first developers for Sony’s PlayStation Network and their
first digitally distributed product become available on the service in 2007 (for the
timeline of Housemarque’s history, see Appendix 3, p. 141). Mr. Kuittinen describes:
‘We [here: Housemarque] were living through very hard times some 8 years ago, there
were big changes going on [in game business] and the new generation of game
consoles was coming up. At that time, these new opportunities [enabled by digital
ecosystems today] did not really exist yet. It was really difficult to find the thing that
would bring our business forward. Then the digital downloadable games came in and it
felt immediately very natural to engage with.’
Ever  since  -  from  the  year  2007  onwards  -  the  firm  has  been  exploiting  the  digital
infrastructure established for the market of downloadable console games by external
parties.
In contrast, the network utilities provided by the vibrant Finnish game industry seem to
have remained modest for Housemarque even in the very beginning of the firm’s
history. In 2003, the firm got to work on projects relating to Nokia’s N-Gage device and
the Nokia Game 2003 competition; however the related contracts were made with a
Dutch marketing communications agency Euro RSGC (later Havas Worldwide).
‘The initial hint [about the opportunity] came from Nokia… It was a very important
project for us in that year. But otherwise Nokia has not had any bigger role for our
business ‘.
Generally,  the  gains  of  the  domestic  network  seem  to  remain  at  the  level  of  single
projects that have eventually had only a relatively small impact on the revenue of
Housemarque.
The  recent  deal  with  Rovio  Entertainment  in  2012  was  mentioned  as  ‘perhaps the
greatest benefit’ contributed by the domestic business network:
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‘It was a very different type of game to what we usually make so I do not think the
project had too much impact on our reputation. It is a kind of seal of acceptance when
one can say we have co-operated with large companies. But the collaboration with
Rovio did not bring us new deals. Our thing is coming through the other [kinds of]
continuums and deals ’
Similarly,  the  game  rewards  granted  within  the  industry  as  well  as  Mr.  Kuittinen’s
personal activity in the operations of Suomen Pelinkehittäjät Ry (an association for the
Finnish game developers) were reckoned to raise ‘goodwill’ among the possible future
partners but not associated with the potential customers or ‘the actual business profit’.
The threat of new entrants in Housemarque’s business environment was described low
as the specialized capabilities necessary in game development set high barriers for
market entrance:
‘The competition [surging in the mobile game market] has not impacted us. Quite the
contrary, almost monthly we receive announcements that some of the console game
developers will shift their focus on a new business area. Not everybody can find their
place in the ecosystem in which we are primarily involved’.
‘Thinking about the historical development of the Finnish game industry… New firms
have arisen when there has been new opportunities opening up. For example, when
Sulake [Corporation] initiated Habbo Hotel2, online gaming had just opened because
the [digital] infrastructure came into use and people begun to use PCs for
entertainment purposes. The second wave has been these different kinds of mobile
games and such. – But I mean the new competition springs up in the areas where the
required level of competencies is lower or substantially different [than in console game
business]. ’
4.4.2 The co-evolution strategy of Housemarque
While  the  conditions  under  which  Housemarque  is  to  implement  their  strategy  were
discussed in the previous section, next the focus will be shifted to explore
Housemarque’s historical co-evolution with its business environment. Thus, the
2 Habbo Hotel is a networking site for youngsters launched in 2000 by a Finnish social entertainment
company Sulake Corporation
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research findings associated with the organizing theme ‘Strategic tools for co-evolution’
are mainly addressed (for the thematic network constructed for this study; see section
4.3, p. 65). A detailed timeline illustrating Housemarque’s corporate history vis-à-vis
the events of their ecosystem development is presented in Appendix 3 (p. 141).
Balancing Reactiveness and Proactivity
While the predominant market trends and channels were said to require mainly reactive
responses from Housemarque (see the previous section), the firm has been able to
anticipate the evolvement of their business ecosystem in relatively early phase over
history. Mr. Kuittinen describes the experiments and trials Housemarque has initiated in
their past:
‘We have been able to see and perceive new opportunities [throughout the history] but
maybe at a bit too early stage. Even in the very beginning of the business we were
considering [the opportunity of] an online game project and made a related prototype
between 1996 and 1997. However, it was a way too early as the proper infrastructure
[here: a broadband network] was missing. A game played by modem just did not work
out. A couple of years later we foresaw the emergence of mobile market and established
a spin-off company SpringToys Ltd in 2000. Again, we were many years too early; there
was the hype but the [mobile] market did not spring up yet.’
At that time – around 8 years before the application marketplaces begun to break
through – the firm’s operations were guided by ‘the idea about mobile handsets as the
most rapidly penetrating media device’ (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an interview). In the
beginning of 21st century,  mobile  operators  were  explained  to  play  the  key  role  in
mobile game distribution: for a developer lacking the sufficient resources to establish
the deal separately with each operator, the only way to get their product to the market
was to use aggregators as intermediaries. However, such a system was not able to give
rise to a thriving mobile ecosystem, leading to the eventual discontinuation of the
business of SpringToys.
Despite the past setbacks experienced in the nascent online and mobile game markets,
Housemarque became an early mover also in the market of digital console games: while
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the company identified the business potential of Xbox Live Arcade3 in 2005, two
related projects were initiated in the following year.
‘Once we saw those [downloadable console] games in the late 2005, we were already
negotiating for two deals in the following year. We had the belief that digital
downloading [of console games] will grow into a big market’.
Consequently, when Sony launched its digital marketplace PlayStation Network in
2006, Housemarque’s Super Stardust HD was one of the first games Sony was able to
publish simultaneously in all of their regional game markets. However, limited
resources have made prioritization necessary for a small firm: when the release of
digital distribution platforms (such as Steam in 2003) opened up new opportunities for
PC games a couple of years before the birth of digital console game market,
Housemarque could not respond.
‘We were maybe 13 or 14 [employees] so we did not have time to undertake that many
projects. We could not really react to the rise of those PC channels. ’
Instead, the market of downloadable console games has remained on the primary focus
of Housemarque until today. Still, the firm’s latest production, a console game Angry
Birds Trilogy, shows the firm has not fully ditched the traditional retail channels but
rather complies the strategy of their partners:
‘We have been involved in both [retail and digital channels] in a way. The digital
distribution has had a great importance [in the business of Housemarque] as almost all
of our games have been distributed digitally in the past few years. However, the
physical distribution of products is not a fully excluded option in future as we have
gradually grown large enough for that to pay off.’
The main challenges faced by the company over the years are very much associated
with the project-based production of games: fundamentally, making the right decisions
and establishing a chain-like flow of deals are the key considerations for Housemarque.
3 Xbox Live Arcade (XBLA) is a marketplace for downloadable console games launched by Microsoft
Corporation in December 2004.
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Especially in the early phase of business when the company focused all the resources on
developing one game at a time, the most critical challenge concerned the convenient
timing  of  projects  as  the  continuity  of  funding  was  to  be  secured.  Later  on  when  the
financial standing of the firm has become more stabilised, the strategic challenge has
shifted to finding the suitable productions for the number of employees available at the
time. Specifically, ability to initiate new concept ideas when some of the key persons
are still tied up with their on-going projects was mentioned to hinder the continuity of
the firm’s processes. In contrast, any significant challenges posed by the potential
labour shortage in the industry (section 4.1, p. 58) were not obtained as the company
has been able to acquire talent whenever the need has arisen.
Risk management
Over the history, Housemarque has typically carried out one or two game development
projects at a time, the firm’s capacity being heavily dependent on the existing number of
employees.  Along  with  the  recent  growth,  the  firm’s  target  has  shifted  to  having  2-3
productions on-going, each in the different stage of development. The past troubles
faced by the firm - originating from focusing on project initiations that later on proved
difficult to find customers for - were mentioned as a reason for why diversification is
perceived important by Housemarque. In the past, the low gross margin complicated
especially the planning and scheduling of the firm’s operations:
‘I am not sure if one can call it a strategy, but we have been persistent conformists. And
we have wanted to try new things out --. In the past five years we have finally broken the
habit of maintaining a sort of ‘survivor-mode’. However, we have always gotten to
follow our interests [product-wise], which has brought our business forward and built
our experience ’.
‘Everything starts from the competence and I see that as strength [of Housemarque].’
In consequence, when permitted by resources, Housemarque begun to seek for risk
reduction and established more than one production line.
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Furthermore, the business model of Housemarque has evolved to embrace greater
variation in terms of product platforms and financing. As noted in the section 4.4.1 (p.
68), the publisher is no longer the only source of project funds as Housemarque has
begun to utilize new types of investors that have entered their business ecosystem in the
recent years. The new model was said to enable more continuous cash flow, allowing
Housemarque to better adjust their operations to rapidly changing market conditions
that the firm cannot really affect. Furthermore, cash flow originating from multiple
sources was noted as a mean to reduce the risk of Housemarque’s business. In addition
to financial aspect, the firm has diversified its product range by adopting new platforms
such as iOS, enabling the firm to build linkages with both console and mobile game
ecosystems.
Finally, two additional means to manage external risks were taken up by Mr. Kuittinen.
First, Housemarque seeks to monitor the prevailing industry trends and endeavours to
respond to them. For example, the firm has begun to offer downloadable extra content
to their games: while the product revenue was traditionally generated as a one-time
event during the initial product purchase, Housemarque has identified the business
models of mobile games to be shifting towards more continual revenue generation.
‘The key question for Housemarque is whether we are able to apply these kinds of
models [in our products]. Namely, the bet is that such models [used in mobile game
business] will become increasingly general on the console game side so that is the
direction we need to develop our business into.’
Thus,  in  addition  to  the  aim  at  variation  in  terms  of  revenue  generation  and  product
platforms, Housemarque’s risk strategy features reactions to industry evolvement. As
the last mean to manage external risks, Housemarque was said to seek for sustaining its
business network bonds by ‘warming up the potential customers’.  However,  due  to
running contracts that may tie Housemarque down for long periods onwards,
maintaining the customer relations was noted challenging.
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Flexibility and adaptiveness
In  terms  of  human  resources,  Housemarque  seems  to  support  flexibility  to  a  great
extent:
‘Our way has been to recruit people that are equipped with skills we are presently
looking for, but then in fact it goes the other way round: the employees themselves find
positions that match their desires and enthusiasm the best. We have tried to give space
for things they have been interested in.’
Thus, although no systematic or conscious capability development initiatives were said
to have been undertaken (section 4.4.1, p. 68), the employees are spurred to follow their
interests unprompted and may even change their roles completely. Earlier in their
history Housemarque has invested substantially in employee training: as a response to a
small pool of talented labour, the firm established a pioneering game programming
program in 2000. Today, call for flexibility is reflected in the firm’s project
management as ‘It is product-dependent who [of the employees] stands out with his or
her contribution and begins to take charge’ (Kuittinen 2.1.2013, an interview). Given
that the main challenges faced by the firm were noted to concern project scheduling
earlier in this section, a small firm needs to embrace a low level of hierarchy and
adjustable roles in their project management practices.
In the case of Housemarque, the urge of enhancing the technical know-how arose ‘a
couple  of  years’  after  the  establishment  of  the  firm,  resulting  in  a  decision  to
differentiate R&D activities from the other operations. Mr. Kuittinen describes:
‘The project-based products we made in the beginning did not feature the components
that we could have utilized in our forthcoming productions. This is why we decided to
begin developing the technology by ourselves and so improve the standard quality of
our products. – Over the years, a significant share of revenue has been invested in tools
and game engines, and later on in the development of new concepts too’.
‘Decision-making must be inevitably flexible. At certain point [of business] you always
face a situation when you need to decide which direction to take. We had that a year
ago. We were just thinking what things we are capable and willing to do [in future]. --
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And if it comes to a halt at some point, then [we] just [think] ‘okey, this path has been
walked through now.’
In addition to the ability to produce games of high technical quality more efficiently, in-
house technologies were said to allow the firm to place a greater emphasis on the actual
content of games.
‘The core [of Housemarque’s business] is to make certain types of products and learn
by doing --. Distribution channels are not the most critical thing to us but rather what
kinds of products we make and how they are being produced. That is what we have been
devoting to. Systematically and for a long time’
‘Currently, we are striving more and more for the capability to initiate new [game]
concepts. We have managed to create new games and IPRs pretty well [lately] and have
gotten certain confidence with that respect.’
Thus, the in-house technology and game concept capabilities have increased the
strategic importance in Housemarque’s operations over the years. Earlier in this section
the in-house technology was found to bring value to Housemarque’s operations as it
allow the firm to develop their products on different platforms, which in turn is a way to
manage business risks. In addition, the importance of concept capabilities was also
reflected in the firm’s project team construct because concept designers were noted to
play an increasingly important role in productions. Finally, the technology proves also
to be the primary tool of Housemarque for adapting to the conditions that emerge from
their  external  business  environment.  In  sum,  the  function  of  technological  tools  and
capabilities is two-fold in the co-evolution strategy of Housemarque and thus
undoubtedly crucial for the firm.
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4.5 Findings on Remedy Entertainment Oy
4.5.1 The strategy of Remedy in a business ecosystem setting
Resources and capability development
Competent personnel lie at the heart of Remedy’s operations. As explained by Mr.
Myllyrinne (19.12.2012, an interview):
‘Obviously competent staff [is the key resource of Remedy’s]. So you’re supposed to get
the best people. And as it happens, the best people like to work with the best people,
regardless their discipline. Finding those kinds of different talents is the most important
thing.’
 In addition to professional skills, the healthy organizational culture fostered by the
employees was noted as a key for Remedy as the firm pursues ‘creative and sometimes
even a little anarchistic’ traits in their business (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview).
Presently, Remedy’s financial standing is relatively stable: about half of the firm’s
revenue is coming from operations that they carry out through partners, and about half
originates from the sales of their self-published products. However, financial resources
were noted as a prerequisite for Remedy’s ability to take risks, and thereby considered
highly important in the firm’s business today.
Although the company has no established processes or practices for developing their
human capital, the firm culture was said to embrace building talent as well as making
mistakes because learning from them is considered highly important. In practice, the
employees are encouraged to enhance their capabilities autonomously by paying for the
initiatives (such as books, games or training) they find worthwhile. Thus, the firm does
invest in human resources to some extent, however their system for capability
development is mainly self-directed by the employees.
‘I would love to say we have a process for learning; that we have institutionalized it, but
no. I think it comes from the people themselves.’
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Planning & decision-making
The explicit and focused approach steering the business of Remedy was highlighted by
Mr. Myllyrinne. Retaining the focus forms the core of their current strategy:
‘Retaining focus is a key [for Remedy] because you only have a limited amount of
people and money. For our strategy in general, we try to remove distractions and
opportunities, and sometimes that can be very hard because it’s very difficult to say no
for tempting opportunities. We have certainly had our share of defining what’s core or
key right now. -- If you try to do too many things, the quality of your work will
automatically suffer. It is a short-term profitability versus long-term brand value
recognition and the happiness of people situation’.
In consequence, Remedy was said to concentrate on a few unique things while avoiding
to do anything beyond, as well as to strive for a performance superior to their
competitors.
Along with the growing scale of Remedy’s operations, the production lead times have
become extended, nowadays requiring the firm to commit around 18 months in
advance. This has set certain constraints to Remedy’s planning processes in recent
years: as a response, the firm has decreased the time between their planning cycles and
follows now a biannual system. Presently, the firm’s principal strategy meeting takes
place in the spring, followed by a review session held 6 months after in order to assess
whether the strategy under implementation is still valid. According to Mr. Myllyrinne,
such  system  serves  Remedy’s  business  well  as  it  ‘makes sure that we take corrective
action as soon as possible, but still gives enough time for things for succeeding’.
In addition, supportive tools such as decision-trees are being adopted in the firm’s
strategic decision-making in order to allow the consideration of different scenarios and
thereby rationalize the process. However, Remedy’s history was said to entail also pure
‘quality of life choices’ too, resulting in the rejection of some deals in their past. The
comment of Mr. Myllyrinne demonstrates how the importance of retaining the firm’s
internal culture is reflected in decision-making:
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‘There have been one or two partners that I just declined to work with; even if we had a
good deal on the table but if the quality of life starts to drop… -- So how happy people
are is really important. If their freedom is taken away too much, you start bleeding
talent. On the other hand, you can’t let them do whatever they want. You need to find a
compromise between commercial and artistic.’
The larger scale of productions has made Remedy redefine the employee roles in the
past ten years. While a single manager previously answered for various key aspects
(such  as  schedule  and  quality)  of  a  project,  such  liabilities  are  now  being  distributed
within the firm whenever possible. Consequently, Remedy has established a dedicated
person or a team to be responsible for different parts of the process, as well as adopted
more structured project management practices within each team. However, the level of
organization and hierarchy is still adjusted to the scale of the given process. The teams
operate  under  their  own  budget  and  targets  while  the  top  management  seeks  to  build
consensus around upper-level themes that steer the business of Remedy:
‘Our plan [in managerial terms] is to have a leisure type focus in what we do. -- It is
important to give the teams a target, and let them define by themselves how to reach
that’.
Specifically, the self-direction of teams is encouraged in order to allow for new ideas
and innovation, which was said to promote the creativity the firm’s operations are
ultimately built on.
Key network relations
At present,  the business of Remedy relies largely on the firm’s external relations.  Mr.
Myllyrinne describes the relation between Remedy and the platform holders:
‘The content is what sells [the devices] so that is why even Apple has come around to us
supporting games --. For Microsoft in 2010, we gave a game that was not available on
a Sony or Nintendo platform, so they got a lot of people to buy their console because
they had something unique. And that for them is very valuable.’
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Remedy seeks to outsource a substantial share of their operations and thereby remain as
lean as possible. In large productions there may be even 10-20 vendors utilized, the
structure of Remedy’s internal project teams reflecting the significance of external
parties in the firm’s operations: the teams may involve a dedicated outsourcing
manager, and the production producers in the last resort are to make sure that all the
different parts fall into place with Remedy’s internal production timely. The extensive
business network is also considered as a supportive tool for capability development: the
firm was said to strive for increasing the number of employees that face external parties
(such as competitors or channels partners) in order to allow them to discover different
trends.
Being a middle-sized player on the market, the firm’s competitive position between
small and well-established operators is considered hospitable by Mr. Myllyrinne:
‘We’re kind of in the switch part where we have enough money, enough people, enough
know-how, enough networks to do what we need to do; like the big companies. But on
the other hand, we’re not too small and [thus] not too constrained‘.
The firm’s ability to compete against larger console game developers with greater
resources was said to build on value proposition through the unique and personal
products; avoidance of head-to-head competition; as well as capability for quick
reactions.
‘We need to be very clever… Working hard is not going to solve the issue, right? -- I
think we need to have a smarter strategy [than our competitors do].’
Remedy considers the role of personal relations highly important in their business:
‘We do spend a lot time and money in building our networks. I think they have always
been the key, now we just have better networks. -- Having access to that [the network]
is kind of the thing that makes us successful. I mean that we can call people and we will
get a response. And that we have various access points to the large companies as well’.
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Personal relations were also noted to generate Remedy access to new areas once the
employees shift their roles internally or change the company they work at. Maintaining
the contacts was said to be especially critical in the United States where switching the
position ‘is just a cultural thing’ among employees. Furthermore, the genuineness of the
relations was emphasized:
‘We don’t just collect business cards and gift baskets, but when we really have friends
who like us and who work with us – we have a really good reputation in the industry
and that’s the key thing for us’.
The role and importance of business network
At root,  the  development  of  digital  infrastructure  has  provided  Remedy a  new way to
access capital through global markets, which in turn has substantially increased the
firm’s risk taking capacity. Previously, the business of Remedy was mainly regulated by
the channel intermediaries who coordinated the retail distribution of console games
world-wide. Mr. Myllyrinne explains:
‘[There are] only six companies [that] can sell games to Walmart. And everybody
knows who those six guys are, which is kind of boring. -- But we have an ecosystem
where you can now launch something and you can feasibly hit it in over 100 countries
world-wide within a day. And you can be on sale and get paid from these different
countries. You’re just waiting for the check to arrive. I think that’s wonderful.’
On the other hand, there are still certain external patterns the firm needs to follow: for
example, the publishers typically strive for establishing new intellectual properties in
the beginning of the game console lifecycle, requiring Remedy to adapt. However, the
firm was noted to be ‘much more enabled by these changes [in our business ecosystem]
than restricted’ for the moment (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview).
In the past, Remedy has received ‘really helpful’ funding for their R&D operations from
Tekes and thereby benefitted from the Finnish ICT cluster in financial terms. In
addition, the invocation of the domestic game developer network can be noticed in the
restructure of Remedy’s Board: today, the Board of Directors involve members from
renowned Finnish game firms (Petri Järvilehto, the executive vice president of games at
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Rovio Entertainment and Ilkka Paananen, the CEO of Supercell are members of the
Board),  which  was  noted  to  bring  more  variety  in  the  firm’s  portfolio  of  skills.  In
consequence, Remedy is able to gain perspective from different network domains such
as mobile game market.
Remedy does not consider the threat of new market entrants to have any remarkable
impact on the firms business as they aim at driving their products by a brand:
‘There’s so much competition that the level does not matter’.
‘I think a quickly evolving market is great market for those who are aggressive and
quick, and for those who can be very agile in their thinking.’
In addition, the firm believes the prospects for the console game market may become
ever propitious as the market has become stagnant or even started to decline:
‘What we’re seeing is that there are less and less large bets being made [once
companies exit the market]. -- We supply the talent that provides that content [for
console games], and the supply has declined rapidly. And [on the other hand] the
demand from the consumer side remains more or less the same. So it’s a very good
market.’
On the other hand, new entrants in the domestic mobile game market – i.e. the rapid
growth of the Finnish mobile game industry – have hindered Remedy from finding
skilled labor force:  the competition for talent was perceived ‘very tough’ on the Finnish
market, making the firm recruit more and more employees abroad.
4.5.2 The co-evolution strategy of Remedy
Similarly to the logic of the previous section, the co-evolution strategy of Remedy is
now explored in seek of empirical evidence for the second main research question of
this  study  (How can Born Globals improve their ability to co-evolve with their
respective business ecosystems over time?). A detailed timeline illustrating the historical
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events of the firm vis-à-vis their ecosystem development is presented in Appendix 4 (p.
142).
Balancing reactiveness and proactivity
Remedy’s corporate history was said to be composed of roughly four different stages.
Mr.  Myllyrinne  describes  the  role  of  demo-scene  (see  section  1.2,  p.  4)  in  the  very
beginning of the firm’s business:
‘Because of the demo-scene in Finland, they [the founders of Remedy] were already
known for the technical skills and they got in touch with various parties. People were
interested; can you make a game?’
Consequently, finding a partner for low-budget productions did not pose any
remarkable challenges for a small start-up:
‘It’s much easier to find a person with 100 thousand dollars than a person with let’s say
30 million Euros’.
At that time, Remedy had six ‘very small, kind of amateur ventures’ in production, three
of which signed with publishers who required milestone-based performance from the
firm.  Fundamentally,  the  ability  to  establish  business  relations  with  ‘predictable’
partners was noted as a key thing for Remedy in the first stage of their business.
After  Remedy’s  debut  game  Death  Rally  in  1996,  the  firm  had  a  desire  to  enter  into
larger productions. In consequence, the second stage in the firm’s history was said to
entail the building of infrastructure and processes necessary for the larger-scale
operations. Furthermore, organizational practices such as building cash-flow forecasts
were adopted for the first time. In 1997, Remedy’s second product, a 3D benchmark
program Final Reality (later 3DMark), was released and later became an industry
standard. However, in the following year Remedy made a strategic decision to remain
as a pure game developer and established a spin-off company Futuremark Ltd to handle
Final Reality.
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In the third stage of corporate history, Remedy made a critical decision about reselling
the IP rights for their Max Payne hit in 2002. In consequence, the financial standing of
Remedy improved significantly. However, the firm was also to deal with various
administrative hurdles relating to currency risk, taxation and royalty issues. Mr.
Myllyrinne explains how the firm with no related experience managed to overcome
such unanticipated challenges:
‘At least some of them you could have avoided if you knew what was coming. -- I spent
two years on six legal cases, and then you start to learn how to adapt to that. -- So you
try to outsource it, to keep it away from your talent and management, because it starts
to be a distraction.’
In the fourth historical stage beginning in the early 21st century, the declining PC market
as well as the Remedy’s need for creating something new after the success of Max
Payne made the firm search for new opportunities:
‘We saw the PC market had declined. -- It was 1.5 billion dollars in North-America in
2001, and it fell to 800 million dollars in 2003. That was a problem. The internet had
come; people were able to pirate and share games, so that destroyed our PC market.
Then we thought we will become a console developer because consoles don’t have any
piracy, right?’
As a small company, Remedy’s desire was said to be to reduce the risk involved in the
new kind of business. Still, the firm did not want to become a multi-platform developer
yet as their intention was to avoid too rapid business growth. As a result, Remedy took a
risk of becoming a strategic partner for one company and signed an exclusive contract
with Microsoft Corporations in December 2005, which mainly defined the direction of
their future business.
‘We wanted to remove a lot of the technology risk, we were a small company. We did
not know what [here: which platform] was going to be successful, we just made a
hypothesis that Microsoft will win’.
Thus, Remedy chose to apply a single-platform strategy in order to ensure moderate
growth, thereby leaving a chance to expand into new platforms later on if necessary.
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However, resource constraints prevented Remedy from responding to the emergence of
digital ecosystems until in the early 2010:
‘We were certainly looking at that space for a long time. But we just did not have the
ability to do it: I mean we were all tied up, all our resources and brain power was tied
up to shipping Alan Wake, a project that had gone on for too long and taken a lot of
money. So we needed to close it [first] and also meet the quality target [set by
Microsoft].’
However, once the team was released from the Alan Wake project, it was very clear for
the company to tap into the new opportunities enabled by digital infrastructure. Since
2011, the company has released a remake of Death Rally for iOS and Android, self-
published a game on XBLA under the brand label of Microsoft as well as brought Alan
Wake available on Steam.
For the present, Remedy is seeking to co-evolve with their ecosystem environment in a
more timely fashion:
‘The change has not ended; it [the ecosystem] will continue to change dramatically into
new platforms and new business models… I think next time round we’d like to be there
earlier, and for that to happen we need to have more slack and resources. That means
enough bandwidth internally [here: employees] and a budget that is unallocated.
In consequence, more proactive traits have been adopted in the firm’s strategy in the
past two years:
‘There’s a slide from profitability and financial stability to growth [in our strategy]. I
mean we have always wanted to do awesome products and win the market, but we’re
realizing that we need to be more aggressive –‘.
Still, Remedy’s ability to take risks was described limited, making the firm as a non-
platform holder unable to invest big sums in their self-publishing initiatives in the near
future.
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Generally, the co-evolution strategy of Remedy contains both reactive and proactive
elements. On one hand, willingness to question the prevailing industry practices has led
the firm to make ‘some technological innovations’ lately. In addition, the uniqueness of
Remedy’s products is fostered by seek of elements that have not been introduced in
games before. Remedy was also said to have undertaken single small-scale trials in their
past: for example, the firm made a demo without a real business potential in order to see
how a certain type of server technology works. Hence, the enthusiasm for learning
proved as Remedy’s motive for proactive initiatives especially in the early stages of
their business.
On  the  other  hand,  call  for  profitability  prevents  a  small  firm  from  anticipating  the
future of devices or digital markets: ‘We need to see a viable market or business before
we can put money on it’ (Myllyrinne 19.12.2012, an interview). Thus, while Remedy’s
proactive initiatives are mainly driven by the employees and associated with the
processes and products; it is not reasonable for the firm to aim at leading the customer
opinions or market trends. Mr. Myllyrinne encapsulated Remedy’s approach to co-
evolution with the firm’s rapidly changing environment:
‘The ability to listen the signals of change as well as the ability to react to the right ones
is the key. It’s not about doing things well, it’s about learning to do new things well,
which is becoming more and more important’.
‘There’s a lot pressure to grow but I want to do it in a sustainable way, where we’re not
doing too many things at once’.
Risk management
Generally, Remedy’s ability to run risk has been limited over their corporate history and
guided the operations of a small company. For the first fifteen years Remedy followed a
strategy of focusing all the resources on one production at time:
‘Till the early 2010 we had a policy or a strategy of following a hit-driven business.
About 5% of the games in the console and PC space brought over 50% of the revenue,
so we wanted to be in that top 5 percent’.
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The exclusive publishing deal made about Alan Wake in 2005 had provided the firm
benefits such as better funding and Microsoft’s marketing machine for the product,
however it limited the sales potential as the game could not be played on other
platforms but Xbox 360 console.
In  2010  when  Remedy  was  able  to  react  to  the  opportunities  generated  by  the  digital
markets, the firm made a shift in strategy in order to gain more independence in their
operations. In consequence, a remarkable change with regard to the firm’s attitude
towards risk-taking can be observed as the company begun to pursuit opportunities
more dynamically and placed a greater emphasis on risk-taking. Basically, in their
remodeled strategy, about a half of the revenue is generated as per the traditional model
(i.e. from larger projects that are founded by external parties) and the rest comes from
the digital distribution through an impartial vendor such as application marketplace. By
this  way,  Remedy  aims  at  reducing  the  riskiness  of  business  while  building  the
capability of going directly to the consumers. Mr. Myllyrinne explains:
‘The ability to take risk and look for fund in different ways [became important to
Remedy]. You never know when you’re going to strike gold – it may be very quickly or
it may take a long time. And the ability to take risk implies that you have money. So you
need access to capital.’
‘The way we approached it was that we saw a lot of growth from the digital side: higher
risk, higher return, smaller bets… So they are kind of our stock in the portfolio. And
then the larger project that goes on for the longer period of time is kind of our bond: it
has a smaller return over longer period of time as a percentage but is huge in volume.
And thus has the potential of high pay-off.’
‘If you don’t invest into the future and take more risk now, then 24 to 36 months after
you’re going to be very reactive. And you’ll either be marginalized or then you’ll die.’
Thus, as a primary mean to manage risk, the company begun to support variation in
their revenue generation.
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‘Our hypothesis is that in two to three years these things [conventional productions and
mobile games] will either converge or one will win, and we’ll be in a good position
anyway.’
‘I’d like to see us to be more independent by having larger revenue share coming from
our own channels and publishing operations [in future]. I think we have much more
control if we have that, and that’s usually a good thing. I’d like to establish a portfolio
of 3-5 of franchises. If we have three different things, maybe different platforms, maybe
different kinds of things; I think that brings more stability and makes more growth.’
Finally, Remedy’s strategy was said to take into account different scenarios associated
with the evolvement of consumer behavior or market trends. The firm has also
established contingency plans for the calculated risks they take. Still, rather than
providing for any extreme scenario, Remedy was said to invest in employees and their
working environment because the firm’s internal confidence in future was noted critical
for their ability to ‘lean forward’.
Flexibility and adaptability
The establishment of operations on multiple platforms has allowed Remedy to better
adjust its resource base according to the changing conditions, thereby enabling greater
operational flexibility. Specifically, while the large-scale productions on the console
side require long-term commitment from the firm, Remedy was noted as ‘perfectly
agile’ and capable of quick moves on Steam and other digital platforms. The company
considers these two sides of their business mutually supportive in the development of
their internal capabilities: Remedy was said to utilize the experiences and learning they
gain from the larger productions in the R&D work conducted for smaller-scale projects.
In turn, the business models and publishing capabilities learned alongside digital
platform operations are helpful in the firm’s other productions.
‘We try to build brands and something that can be transferred from one media to
another.  We don’t really build a game [but] we try to establish a franchise.’
As another way to keep pace with the constantly moving markets, Remedy was said to
push their decision-making to the lowest level possible. Specifically, by making the
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teams highly autonomous the firm strives for more efficient scaling and readiness for
fast reactions.
Finally, when asked about factors that enhance the competitiveness of Remedy in the
constantly moving environment, three aspects were encapsulated by Mr. Myllyrinne:
‘The biggest thing goes back to being able to learn. And adaptability. -- The second
thing is the retention of talent and staff [on the whole] in a market that’s overheating or
in hyper-competition for talent. The last thing is the ability to execute in a much more
complex organization and much more complex market, where we have very different
products’.
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5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
5.1Cross-case Analysis
In the following section the findings of the two interviews are mutually contrasted and
discussed in the context of the existing literature.
5.1.1 The strategy of the case firms in a business ecosystem setting
Resources and capability development
Both case companies consider the competence of their personnel as the most critical
resource of the firm. Skilled employees were perceived as the main source of ideas and
creativity, on which the competitiveness of both firms is ultimately based. While
Remedy emphasized the ‘good’ and ‘healthy’ internal culture that inspires their
employees  and  helps  the  company  retain  talent,  Housemarque  stressed  the  skills  on  a
more down-to-earth level by noting technical capacity, concept know-how as well as the
capabilities to sell ideas as the key for the firm. The small pool of skilled labour in the
home country market proved a challenge for Remedy, which supports the finding of
Boxberg (2012). Instead, Housemarque was not found to having suffered from such a
hurdle.
Financial resources were noted as the second key resource of the case companies. The
production-based nature of business has resulted in highly volatile revenue flows, which
has caused challenges especially to Housemarque. Consistently with the earlier research
findings (Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006; Falay et al. 2007; Sasi et al. 2009; ‘Suomen
pelitoimialan strategia…’ 2010), Housemarque confronted the weak availability of
money in its home market in the early phases of business. In contrast, Remedy was able
to benefit from the financial R&D support granted by Tekes and basically was not
found to have faced any significant challenges with this respect. Instead, their main
challenges rather concerned currency fluctuation, taxation and royalty issues, which
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supports the earlier research findings relating to the liability of foreignness Born
Globals from small economies may suffer from (see Arenius et al. 2006; Sasi & Arenius
2008). To summarize, the empirical evidence indicates the case companies have been
constrained by resource scarcity.
Despite skills being a very critical organizational resource of both firms, neither one of
them had a systematic process for competence enhancement. Instead, encouraging the
employees to learn by doing seemed to be the main way to contribute the development
of internal capabilities. Thus, the role of learning appeared highly important to both
firms  and  was  driven  mainly  by  the  interests  of  their  employees.  In  addition,  Remedy
noted the contact points of their employees with other actors in the business network to
support their capability building, which is a novel standpoint as regards to the existing
business ecosystem strategies of Moore (1996) and Iansiti & Levien (2004a). The
finding supports the literature highlighting the role of dynamic capabilities as well as
absorptive capacity in the firm’s co-evolution strategy (see e.g. Cohen & Levinthal
1990; Teece et al. 1997, Gupta & Govindarajan 2000; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000;
O’Callaghan 2007; Cravens et al. 2009; Teece 2011).
Planning and decision-making
Generally, the case companies have very different approaches to planning and decision-
making. The operations of Remedy are currently steered by a focused strategy with a
clearly defined scope. Concentration on ‘few unique things’ as a basis of Remedy’s
opportunity identification lends support to the strategy of simple rules proposed by
Eisenhardt & Sull (2001). Thus, a small firm with limited resources needs to seek
competitive advantage through a strategy that builds on a few selected and clearly
defined focus areas. On the other hand, the resource constraints prevent a small firm
from pursuing competitive advantage by tapping into new opportunities if those
opportunities lie too far from the firm’s strategic focus.
In  addition,  Remedy  has  ‘increased their internal clock speed’ through a biannual
planning cycle with the primary object of ensuring the validity of their current strategy.
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Thus, along with business growth that has increased the rigidity of operations;  a small
firm has begun to seek for more agility by revising the direction of their  strategy on a
regular  basis.  In  this  sense,  the  strategy  of  Remedy  bears  resemblance  to  the  idea  of
time pacing (Eisendhardt & Brown, 1998) but is just implemented at a fairly moderate
pace. Still, the author would like to note that the finding does not fully support the time
pacing theory as Remedy’s system is not established in the specific purpose of ensuring
a regular change but verifying the validity of their current strategy.
Housemarque, in turn, was found to have only a limited ability to plan ahead, making
the firm follow a rather unstructured and unscheduled system. In consequence, their
planning is mainly driven by new and on-going projects. Thus, a small firm with limited
power on the market has to adjust its operations according to unsettled revenue flows by
reacting to the opportunities it identifies. Consequently, investments in the internal
technology and concept know-how become increasingly significant because the firm
cannot  plan  too  proactively.  Interestingly,  the  role  of  the  founders  proved  crucial  as
their current understanding of the market as well as the ability to ‘sense’ new trends
functioned as a key determinant of Housemarque’s strategic direction. The finding
provides a novel contribution to the ecosystem strategy of a small, entrepreneurial firm.
For the moment, the way Housemarque is running their business can be mostly
associated with intuitive strategies identified by Rubenstein & Grundy (1999).
However, it seems the firm is gradually reaching the point where certain strategic
decisions are necessary to make: while Housemarque’s way to manage business
operations heretofore can be characterized as relatively informal by nature, there is an
increasing need to determine the internal management practices as well as the future
direction of the firm’s operations further. The contrast between the planning and
decision-making systems of the case firms may be partially explained by the scale of
their operations: specifically, also Housemarque has confronted a call for greater
organization along with their recent business growth. This can be considered to lend
further support to strategies comprising simple rules because such strategies were noted
to provide more structure for a firm’s business by Eisenhardt & Sull (2001). In addition,
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the empirical evidence indicates that the way the case companies organize and manage
their business operations will probably become increasingly alike in future.
Finally, the ability to follow the firm’s ultimate desire proved a connective factor
between the case companies and was found to guide the strategic decisions of them
both. Despite Remedy’s seek for rationalism in decision-making, the strategic choices
are conditional on preserving their internal culture: the firm has declined some deals in
the past because they did not consider the partnering sides worthwhile. Also
Housemarque was noted having been able to ‘do their thing’ throughout the history,
which was consider highly important by the firm. Thus, despite limited resources, a
small firm is reluctant to compromise their strategic intent but strives to fulfil their
vision.
Key network Relations
The primary business network of Housemarque can be characterized as small but
significant. Their network encompasses primarily publishers and investors, which form
the key relations of the firm. Since the firm is still publishing the majority of their game
concepts through a partner, the operations of Housemarque are vulnerable to their
actions. However, new types of investors attracted by the game industry in recent years
have reduced the dependence of Housemarque on the well-established publishers solely.
In other words, the alternative monetary sources that have become available in the
business ecosystem have increased the autonomy of a small firm that formerly had to
mainly  heed  the  demand  of  the  publishers.  Still,  given  the  small  pool  of  direct
customers, the reputation building appeared critical to Housemarque especially at the
earlier stages of their business. Later on the reputation of the firm has turned an edge
over competitors and new market entrants with less extensive track records.
In contrast, the business of Remedy relies on external relations to a great extent as the
firm seeks to outsource as many parts of their productions as possible. Generally, their
business network can be characterized as diverse and extensive, thereby differing
remarkably from that of Housemarque. Being a middle-sized player on the market
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benefits Remedy because it allows the firm to balance the operational autonomy and
organizational agility. In addition, the personal relations of the employees were found to
play highly important role in the firm’s business because they contribute the efficiency
of operations and allow Remedy to extend their network reach. Housemarque, in turn,
considered personal networks helpful in their talent acquire. Thus, the empirical
evidence shows that investments in building and retaining the personal relations of the
employees may be especially critical to a small firm. Specifically, personal relations
may help a small firm to promote their operations and network position beyond the
formal inter-organizational relations. The aspect is novel to the existing ecosystem
literature: yet only Moore (1996: 269) has touched upon the idea of one’s personal
ecosystem but considered the concept from the viewpoint of the individual’s learning
rather than as a source of actual business benefit.
Generally, despite of operating in the same industry and in the same country, the
business  networks  of  the  case  companies  turned  out  to  be  very  differing.  While  the
essence of publishers and investors for Housemarque came up in several contexts
during the interview with Mr. Kuittinen, these network actors were not highlighted in
particular by Mr. Myllyrinne. Rather, the products of Remedy were considered to drive
value for the device markets (i.e. the business of the ecosystem keystones), therefore
improving their position against platform holders such as Microsoft. Thus, the
interdependency between the content and the devices may benefit a small firm because
the firm can utilize the exclusivity of deals as a way to increase its negotiation power in
the ecosystem, as seen in the case of Remedy’s Alan Wake deal. Generally, the business
network of Remedy seemed to comprise more diverse group of actors, each being
important to the firm but from the different operational aspects.
Finally, it seems the strategic decision of whether to deliberately start extending the
firm’s network with respect to subcontractor relations has not been necessary to
Housemarque until recently. Along with the recent growth and more sophisticated
capabilities, it is gradually becoming timely for the firm to consider which activities are
reasonable to outsource to allow leaner processes. Consistently with the findings
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discussed earlier, this provides further support to the idea of the case companies
becoming more alike operation-wise in future.
The role and importance of business network
Business network was found to be a precondition for the growth and survival of both
Housemarque and Remedy: from the very beginning both firms have been essentially
reliant on external funding coming from the foreign publishers, and thereby have
utilized their business ecosystem as a principal way for acquiring finance.
In addition, the case companies have exploited external resources to overcome the
challenge of global market access: initially, the products of the firms were distributed
solely through multinational publishers, which is in line with the previous research
findings  concerning  the  sales  channels  of  Born  Globals  (see  Jolly  et  al.  1992;
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006; Isenberg 2008). Later on, the infrastructure provided
by digital ecosystems has allowed Housemarque and Remedy an option to distribute
their products without the conventional channel intermediaries, which has increased
their operational autonomy and allowed greater variation in terms of product range.
Thus, unlike noted by Jolly et al. (1992), finding a partner is no longer a prerequisite for
the competitiveness and existence of the case firms, as their products can be distributed
without a publisher. Such a diversification has improved especially the network position
of  Remedy  as  about  a  half  of  the  firm’s  revenue  flow  is  today  generated  outside  the
publisher-driven productions. Also Housemarque was noted to be constantly striving for
a similar kind of goal. These findings back up the logic according which a niche player
should seek to establish loosely coupled connections with the firm’s ecosystem co-
participants (see Iansiti and Levien 2004a: 134-138).
Thus, as one of the key findings of the empirical study, the case companies have begun
to exploit the infrastructure of digital ecosystems in order to overcome the resource
constraints they used to suffer from. This lends support to the typical feature of Born
Globals concerning the utilization of modern technologies (F7). Consistently, Burger-
Helmchen & Cohendet (2011: 318) note game companies need ‘technological virtuosity
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to meet the constraints of the economics of mass entertainment’. The finding support
also the Born Global literature proposing that the digital distribution has been a crucial
catalyst for the competitiveness of these firms (see Koiso-Kanttila 2004; Arenius et al.
2006). Finally, the findings are in line with the theory of Moore (2006: 46) who notes
the modularity and open interfaces enabled by Web 2.0 provide public or near-public
resources the ecosystem members can exploit.
However, the ecosystem was also found to set constraints to the case firms. Specifically,
the lacking infrastructure and the overall ‘immaturity’ of the ecosystem limited the
growth of Housemarque remarkably twice in their  past.  Also Remedy was noted to be
required  to  follow certain  technological  life  cycles  in  their  current  business.  Thus,  the
dual  role  the  ecosystem  plays  in  the  business  of  a  small,  global  firm  should  be
acknowledged: the ecosystem may provide a solution for many challenges the firm
cannot overcome on its own but at the same time the ecosystem may dictate the
operations of the firm to a large extent. The finding is very central to the research
problem of this study because it has had major implications on the strategies of the case
companies. In addition, it provides further empirical validation for the research work
conducted on the network challenges and constraints of small firms (see section 2.2.4, p.
31)
However, the empirical evidence also deviates from the prevailing understanding with
certain respect. According to Neogames (2011), as a consequence of digital distribution
the strategic focus of game firms has shifted from accessing the marketplace to dealing
with fierce competition. However, neither one of the case companies was found to
address their competitors as a specific consideration in their strategy. For example,
Remedy’s concerns with regard to competition were mostly associated with their
capability to acquire talent rather than the potential impacts on their customer demand
or product sales.
Instead, the stagnant or even decreasing console game market was perceived a rather
favourable trend by Remedy and Housemarque. Thus, operation outside the market
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domain that is mostly targeted by newcomers was found to provide the case firm a
hedge against competition. In addition, both companies had an idea to drive their
business by brand or reputation, which was noted helpful when seeking to pass over the
competition. On the other hand, the declining number of market operators caused
Housemarque concerns about the longevity of the end-customer demand as well as the
subsistence of the network actors the firm’s operations are reliant on. The aspect was
not brought up by Mr. Myllyrinne, probably because the business of Remedy is more
diversified and thus less vulnerable to such a contingency.
On the basis of the empirical findings discussed above, the following contribution to the
ecosystem niche player theory of Iansiti & Levien (2004) may be suggested: instead of
moving rapidly to a new niche area, an established niche player may benefit from the
opportunities that still lie in their decreasing niche domain until the market eventually
turns atrophied. Still, at the same time the firm must seek to guarantee their future
survival by fostering the capability of establishing new loosely coupled connections to
the thriving ecosystem platforms.
The significance of domestic business network turned out dissimilar in the operations of
the case firms. While the network benefits gained by Housemarque have been only
small-scale and mainly indirect by nature, Remedy has managed to exploit the Finnish
network since the very beginning of their business. Generally, while these gains were
principally financial at the early stage of the Remedy’s business (e.g. R&D funding), it
seems the firm has begun to strive for greater absorb of business intelligence along with
the maturation of their business. In other words, their focus with regard to pursuit of
network utilities has shifted from compensating the internal resource insufficiencies to
more intentional acquire of intangible, high-level knowledge resources. This supports
the findings of Coviello & Cox (2006) about the explorative, gradually changing
resource acquire strategies of Born Globals. Basically, the firm has been able to
establish a fairly hospitable position in the relatively compact network of Finnish game
developers, which allows the linkages with some of the key players within the industry.
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Worth noting is that also the personal network of Remedy’s founders benefitted the firm
notably in the start-up stage.
Instead, Mr. Kuittinen noted the domestic network does not really facilitate
Housemarque’s business as the large, publisher-level network actors are lacking. Such a
contrast may be partially explained by the interviewees’ different way to consider what
creates value to their firm. However, it also indicates the firm’s ability to realize the
utilities of their business network is dependent on their capability to infiltrate in the
specific network in question.
In sum, the case firms were found to exploit their business ecosystem as a source of
complementary resources - especially those relating to project funding and product
distribution, which is consistent with the finding of Sasi & Arenius (2008). Specifically,
both companies have utilized their ecosystem infrastructure in order to resolve the
challenges associated with limited resources and global market access. In turn, the
utilities of domestic business network encompassed primarily intangible assets such as
acquire of knowledge and business intelligence. While the domestic network of a small
global firm may facilitate the business especially at the early stage, the business
ecosystem and its infrastructure are the ultimate precondition for their firm’s growth and
survival. Hence, the typical Born Global feature concerning the importance of networks
(F4) is fulfilled by the case firms (see section 2.1.1, p. 9).
5.1.2 The co-evolution strategy of the case firms
Balancing reactiveness and proactivity
Generally, both case companies were required to carry out reactive actions towards the
evolving market trends and channels because as small operators they did not really have
the power to perform proactively with that regard. Instead, the willingness to learn and
enhance internal competencies has been a key driver for the proactive performance of
the firms. The empirical evidence shows both companies begun the deliberate seek of
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better technology a couple of years after their establishment. Thus, it appears the firms
aimed at building a solid internal system that would then allow development of more
sophisticated capabilities. In addition, the build of technology base was crucial for small
operators that sought for less dependency on their partners. The in-house technologies
and know-how were found especially crucial to Housemarque and have stayed at the
heart of their operations until today. In sum, the proactive side of the case companies’
co-evolution strategy is mainly reflected in their experimental product trials the firms
have initiated over the years. Learning proved as a common motive of the case firms:
for example, Mr. Myllyrinne (19.12.2012, an interview) justified Remedy’s decision to
release a PC version of Alan Wake by ‘We got to see how Steam works’.
Especially Housemarque has actively engaged in new opportunities the firm has
identified over years. However, the appropriate timing of these actions has posed
considerable challenges for a small firm especially in the early phase of business
(Kuittinen 2.1.2013, and interview). Generally, it seems the areas where proactive
performance is possible for a small firm are delimited by the firm’s ability to take risk:
the aspect came up especially in the co-evolution strategy of Remedy as the risk
considerations made the firm settle on a single platform strategy in 2005. Finally,
resource limitations have made prioritization necessary to both firms: for example, both
Housemarque and Remedy have established a spin-off company in their past in order to
retain the focus on their core business.
Generally, the empirical findings are in line with what Iansiti & Levien (2004a: 219)
call a holistic technology strategy: rather than capacity to perform autonomous
innovation, niche players need capability to architect and integrate external technology.
This enables them to better manage the large variety of different technological changes
these firms tend to face simultaneously (Ibid). To summarize, the empirical findings
indicate the firms must balance their reactivity and proactiveness in relation to
conditions of their business ecosystem, which is in line with viewpoint of co-
evolutionary organizational theories (see Levin & Volberda 1999, 2003; Levin 1999;
Cantwell et al. 2009). While the external market conditions require primarily reactive
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responses from a small firm, proactiveness can be seen in the firm’s initiatives that aim
at developing the internal capabilities so that the firm can better respond to those
external conditions. Thus, proactiveness as a trait of business strategy should be
distinguished from the firm’s internal proactiveness that is mainly driven by the
employees. Thus, the empirical evidence contributed to the existing literature by
providing a more detailed specification of the matter.
Finally, Housemarque’s initial business idea ‘to make a hit and that’s it’ was said to be
unchanged and still at the heart of the firm’s operations. Despite the firm’s eventful
history involving several attempts to pursue new opportunities, certain changeless
principles that have guided the direction of Housemarque’s business over time can be
identified.  As a basis of decision-making, the firm was said to follow the options that
they are capable and interested to undertake: for example, the company has purposely
opted out of developing games for Facebook game market or experimenting free-to-play
models,  as  ‘it is just not our thing’.  Similarly,  the  clear  focus  guiding  the  strategy  of
Remedy was brought up in multiple contexts by Mr. Myllyrinne. As providers of
creative content, game companies need to create strategies that allow balancing the
creativity and efficiency (see e.g. Cohendet & Simon 2009; Burger-Helmchen &
Cohendet 2011).
Thus, although Housemarque’s approach proves fairly informal overall compared to
that of Remedy’s, the firm’s ecosystem strategy can be characterized as competence-
centred, interest-driven as well as enterprising by nature. Overall, it appeared the
founders’ ability to hunch opportunities played an important role in guiding the
direction  of  Housemarque  as  the  urge  of  ‘finding  the  thing’  that  would  bring  their
business forward came up several times during the interview. Lately, some degree of
strategic thinking has come in Housemarque’s business with regard to risk management,
brand building and the new capabilities required in self-publishing. As a new
opportunity, the company has identified service elements to be added in the games.
Kuittinen (2.1.2013, an interview) exemplifies how the aspect of strategic planning is
gradually becoming adopted in business practices: ‘Previously, we did not have any
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‘games as a service’ [aspect] in our strategy, but now we at least know it is something
we should take into account [when planning for the future]’.
Risk management
Generally,  the  aspect  of  business  risk  was  touched  upon  several  times  by  Mr.
Myllyrinne, indicating the related considerations play an important role in the co-
evolution strategy of Remedy. To put the firm’s current philosophy in short, they
consider finance is a precondition for the ability to take risk, which in turn is a
precondition for succeeding in the long run. In turn, risk management seemed to play a
less  central  role  in  the  strategy  of  Housemarque:  Mr.  Kuittinen  took  certain  things  up
when asked but did not bring them up on his own initiative in particular.
In the beginning of their business, Remedy tapped into many opportunities
simultaneously but sought for stability through steady partner as the firm was highly
reliant on external funding. Yet until 2010 the firm’s desire for sustainable growth
outweighed their willingness to take substantial business risks that would have entailed
greater growth potential. However, when the firm eventually became able to expand
their business into digital markets, they adopted a more aggressive strategy. Thus, when
permitted by the resources, a small firm - that had already become mature - responded
to the evolvement of their business environment by consciously beginning to take more
risks.
Planning and scheduling of projects were found to cause challenges to Housemarque
especially in the early years of their operations. Although the problem may be common
in many industries, it is especially critical in project-based business as the ability to
establish a flow of projects determines the overall survival of a small firm. As a
response to such a challenge, both case companies begun to seek for variation in order
to reduce the risks relating to their large productions and resource dependency.
Specifically, Remedy and Housemarque strove for having more simultaneous projects
on-going and started to develop games that support multiple platforms. This proved the
most significant way for both companies to seek to manage external risk. Furthermore,
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variation in terms of project scale and type is closely linked to more continuous revenue
generation, which was another aspect that was considered highly important by the
interviewees.
The empirical findings are in line with the theories of Iansiti & Levien (2004a: 135) and
Adner (2006) who noted the firm’s strategic focus should be placed on managing risks
and dependencies that occur in the ecosystem setting. In addition, empirical material
supports the literature proposing variation and multiple alternatives as means to deal
with risks and uncertainty in rapidly changing markets (see e.g. Aldrich et al. 1984,
Eisenhard & Martin 2000; Iansiti & levien 2004a; Cantwell et al. 2009).
Out of the case firms especially Remedy has managed to gain more stability and
predictability in their operations by balancing the large console game productions and
smaller-scale digital publications in their business model. In addition, the reinforcement
of the firm’s internal culture can be seen as an additional mean of countering the
uncertainty that emerges from the business environment. In turn, the role of in-house
technology proved critical especially to Housemarque: flexible tools and technologies
allow the firm to pursue untapped market opportunities and respond to industry trends
they identify, thereby helping the firm to reduce business risk. In future, both companies
were noted to strive for more independence by having a larger share of revenue coming
from their self-publishing operations.
Flexibility and adaptability
Generally, both interviewees emphasized the organizational flexibility several times
during the interview, which indicates the aspect is crucial to a small firm. Specifically,
both case companies appeared to foster their ability to adapt to external requirements by
embracing internal flexibility wherein the role of employees proved very central.
Again in the co-evolution strategy of Housemarque, the importance of internal tools and
technologies stood out as they allow the firm a greater flexibility product-wise (i.e.
Housemarque is able to develop games for different platforms). In addition, internal
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capabilities - specifically concept know-how - were noted to contribute to the quality of
products, which the firm believes is their fundamental success factor in future. Thus, as
a primary tool for adjusting to their ecosystem environment, Housemarque seems to
enhance their technical capacity as well as product-related competencies. Similarly,
capability configuration was proposed as the main contributor to the firm’s market fit by
Taghian & Shaw (2010).
Consistently, the aspect of learning turned out to be significant for Remedy: by bringing
the know-how from larger productions to bear smaller ones and vice versa, the firm is
able to extend the variety and applicability of their skills base. This in turn helps
Remedy to operate in the digital environment where the products and business models
are becoming increasingly diverse. Thus, as a tool for increasing the organizational
flexibility, a firm appeared to seek for a learning pattern between their different areas of
expertise and thereby contribute to the technical and employee skills. The finding lends
support to the literature on dynamic capabilities.
In addition, the upper-level decision-making at Housemarque was found to embrace a
great flexibility as their strategic decisions tended to reflect responses to the new
opportunities scented by the founders. Also the firm’s practices with regard to employee
and project management were highly flexible and featured a minor level of bureaucracy.
Similarly, Remedy was noted to attempt to push decision-making primarily to team-
level. Thus, flexibility in terms of internal management practices seems to be used to
increase the organizational agility of a small firm.
Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that the ability of a small firm to co-evolve
with the rapidly moving markets relies strongly on the continuous development of their
internal capabilities. Consistently, Redwood & Ford (2012) identified the capabilities to
obey the dynamics of business network, to understand firm’s own limitations, to scan
across discrete business networks, to build relationships and to develop and combine the
resources and activities as the potential success factors of the Born Global firm they
studied. In a creative and labor-intensive industry the contribution of employees is
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crucial and this is why retaining talent is the key for the firm. A unified culture across
the organization was found to help Remedy to maintain and develop their skills base.
Thus, it is not only the variation in terms of the number and scale of productions, but
also variation in terms of their purpose and outcome that is likely to enhance the firm’s
competitiveness in future. Finally, Figure 18 summarizes the key points of the cross-
case analysis presented in the sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 (from p. 95 onwards).
Figure 18: A summary of the cross-case analysis
The strategy of the case firms in a
business ecosystem setting
The co-evolution strategy of the case
firms
Resources and capability development
- Competence and capabilities of
employees
- Learning by doing
- Financial resources as the key and as a
constraint
Planning and decision-making
- Remedy: A focused strategy supported
by a regular planning cycle
- Housemarque: Role of founders
significant, sense of fleeting
opportunities determines the strategy to
a large extent
Key network relations
- Very different between the case firms.
- The development of business
ecosystems has reshaped the power
relation within the network.
The role and importance of business network
- Highly critical for both case firms but
plays also a constraining role in their
business.
- Used as a source of compensatory
resources
- Especially the infrastructure of digital
ecosystems has opened up new
opportunities
Balancing reactiveness and proactivity
- Reactive actions towards the evolving
market trends and channels,
willingness to learn as the main driver
for proactive performance
Risk management
- Remedy: Risk management
implemented systemically, strong
organizational culture as an important
tool
- Housemarque: Flexibility in terms of
tools and technologies very important
- Both: Seek of variation in terms of
project number, scale and type. Strive
for greater financial independence with
help of self-publishing
Flexibility and adaptability
- Very crucial for both firms. Flexibility
in terms of internal practices important,
internal capabilities are the main tool
for fostering adaptability.
- Remedy: seeks to establish internal
learning patterns
- Housemarque: investments in internal
tools and technologies
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5.2 Discussion
In this section, the author elaborates the case study findings further and attempts to
address the original research questions with the knowledge gained from the exploration
of the empirical material. A table summarizing the expected and obtained responses to
the research questions is presented in the end of the section (Figure 19, p. 111).
On  the  basis  of  the  cross-case  analysis  (section  5.1,  p.  94),  it  can  be  said  the  case
companies meet the seven characteristics that were identified as typical Born Global
features in section 2.1.1 (p. 9). This is why the author proposes it is justified to consider
the case companies as Born Globals and apply the related academic theories when
seeking  to  respond to  the  research  questions  of  this  study.  A table  presenting  the  key
points of the given justification is placed in Appendix 5 (p. 143) in order to further
validate the correspondence between the case companies and Born Globals.
The strategy of Born Globals in business ecosystem setting
The empirical evidence helps to validate that the emergence of business ecosystems has
radically shaped the business environment of Born Globals. As ecosystems reduce the
need of small firms to tie up their limited resources, the ecosystem environment appears
very attractive to Born Globals and has major implications in their strategy. Today,
ecosystems allow small global firms to strengthen the weaknesses they have
traditionally suffered from (for the SWOT model illustrating the new setting, see Figure
10, p. 35).
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the ecosystem strategy of a
Born Global correspond to the strategy of ecosystem niche players. Generally, the
empirical evidence supports the ecosystem theories of Moore (1996) and Iansiti &
Levien (2004a) as the significance of high-value capabilities as well as the importance
of co-evolution proved indisputable to both Housemarque and Remedy. In addition, the
ecosystem niche strategy presented by Iansiti&Levien (2004a) seems applicable to Born
Global features and can be summarized as follows: When entering an ecosystem niche
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domain, the specific value adding capabilities - possibly enhanced by the
entrepreneurial mind-set of Born Global managers - are critical to successful market
penetration. Leveraging the external resources available in the ecosystem (i.e. the
utilization of a firm’s business network) facilitates the value creation capabilities of the
firm. When the position in an ecosystem is being established, the company must
guarantee the sustainability of its external resources by co-evolving with the key
members of the ecosystem. The utilization of multiple platform strategy helps a small
firm to manage the risks posed by its network dependency. Thus, the empirical evidence
being in line with the theories on ecosystem niche player strategy, it can be concluded
that the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals corresponds to the strategy of ecosystem
niche players.
However, the evidence obtained during this research provides also some specification
and novel insights into the current knowledge of ecosystem niche player strategies.  In
order to overcome the challenges of resource scarcity, niche operation and global
market access, this study proposes Born Globals to utilize mainly explorative strategies
for acquiring resources from their respective ecosystem. Also the existing literature on
Born Globals lends support to this view (see e.g. Coviello & Cox 2006; Yamakawa et
al. 2011). This study also found evidence that the way Born Global acquire resources
may change over time. While the strategy of Housermarque built strongly on their
capability of making high-quality products, Remedy emphasized the focused approach
as well as the firm’s culture as their key success factors. Generally, the enhancement of
internal competence base – especially creative and technical capabilities – was found to
be very central to the strategy of Born Globals.
Still,  this  study  proposes  the  dual  role  of  the  business  ecosystem  is  crucial  to
acknowledge by Born Globals: in addition to new opportunities, the ecosystem setting
brings on constraints the firm strategy must address. Specifically, Born Globals were
found highly reliant on their external network, and this is why the ecosystem strategy of
a Born Global should focus on managing their organizational dependencies.  As a
means to gain additional network benefits and thereby improve the firm’s strategic
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position in the ecosystem, personal relations of the employees proved important.
Because Born Globals have only relatively little power in their business ecosystems,
their strategy features active seek of opportunities that open up in their environment.
The co-evolution strategy of Born Globals
First  of  all,  it  is  important  to  note  that  both  case  firms  underwent  long  periods  of
considerable uncertainty before their actual commercial breakthrough. Still, without any
guarantee on their overall survival, both firms have managed to renew their business on
constant basis and thereby co-evolve with their business ecosystems.
The findings of this study indicate Born Globals seek to co-evolve with their respective
ecosystems by reshaping their strategies both reactively and proactively. Specifically,
the  co-evolution  strategy  that  a  Born  Global  is  able  to  implement  was  found  to  be
dependent on the prevailing level of resources available. In addition, the empirical
evidence suggests Born Globals utilize relatively simple strategic rules and processes in
order to deal with the rapidly changing environment and consequential uncertainty.
Experiential learning proved essential in the co-evolution of Born Globals because it
was found as their primary way of enhancing internal capabilities. Furthermore,
flexibility appeared an important trait in the co-evolution strategy of these firms and
was reflected especially in their in-house technology as well as internal management
practices.
This study also suggests Born Globals support variation and multiple strategies as a
means to adapt to their respective ecosystems. The case companies were found to focus
on product development and resource acquisition in their start-up phase, which backs up
the idea of Born Globals having ‘multiple strategies’ simultaneously instead of them
taking place in a consecutive manner (see Sasi 2010; Sasi & Arenius 2011). This is one
of the main implications the rapidly changing ecosystems are causing to small firms: in
order to secure competitiveness in the long run, the firms may need to pursue new
environments on constant basis. While the scarce resources may hinder newly-
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established Born Globals from realizing variation in their operations strategy, the
findings  of  this  study  show  Born  Globals  still  actively  seek  for  variation  in  their
business.
Consequently, opportunity identification was found crucial for the ability of a Born
Global to evolve with their ecosystem. If a Born Global is highly reliant on external
parties and suffers from severe resource scarcity, ability to hunch and tap into these
opportunities may be very critical to the survival of the firm. According to the cyclical
model of technological change (see Anderson & Tushman 1990), dominant design
eventually leads to discontinuity and will be replaced by new dominant technologies
(see also Tushman & Anderson 1986). This being said, the ecosystem participants
should keep in mind that the digital platforms they currently support are not static but
under incremental change. When a new dominant design comes to supersede the exiting
one, these firms need to be prepared to align their businesses to the new direction
platform-wise.
Along with the firm maturity, variation in terms of product types and platforms as well
as sources of investment funds and revenue was found to help Born Globals to manage
risks that emerge from their business ecosystem. In addition, establishment of loosely
coupled connections with several key participants of the ecosystem makes a Born
Global less vulnerable to external shocks. The empirical evidence also indicates that
along with the business growth and greater resource base, the ecosystem strategy of a
Born Global may turn to emphasize stricter focus as well as more deliberate risk-taking.
Finally,  to summarize the discussion presented in this section, the author proposes the
following: in addition to the obligation of Born Globals to evolve with their ecosystem,
the emphasis of their ecosystem strategy should evolve in accordance with the firm’s
maturity level. This is because Born Globals were found to become more capable to
manage the dependency on their ecosystem co-participant once their operations get
more stabilized. Figure 19 presents a recapitulation of the original research questions;
the preliminary expectations that were formed on the basis of the current academic
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discourse; as well as the actual responses to the research questions that were obtained in
the  empirical  part  of  this  study.  In  other  words,  Figure  19  is  a  completed  version  of
Figure 11 that was built in the end of the literature review in section 2.3.2 (p. 43).
Figure 19: A Summary of the expected and obtained responses to the original research questions
Research
Question
Expected Obtained
Does the
ecosystem
strategy of Born
Global firms
correspond to
the strategy of
ecosystem niche
players?
The strategies of Born Globals
feature differentiation through
unique capabilities and high
orientation towards co-
evolution with business
environment; and can be thus
paralleled by the strategy of
ecosystem niche players.
- BGs utilize mainly
explorative strategies for
acquiring resources from their
respective ecosystem.
- Newly-established BGs
support variation and multiple
strategies as a mean to adapt
to their respective ecosystems.
- Need for market-based
adaptations?
The ecosystem strategy of Born Globals corresponds
to the strategy of ecosystem niche players.
- BGs utilize mainly explorative strategies for
resource acquire and thereby seek to overcome the
challenges of resource scarcity, niche operation and
global market access. The way BGs acquire resources
may change over time.
- The enhancement of internal competencies is central
to the ecosystem strategy of BGs.
- BGs must address the dual role of business
ecosystems and in consequence focus on managing
organizational interdependencies.
- The strategy of BGs features active seek of
opportunities that open up in the ecosystem.
- The personal networks of employees are important
to BGs.
- BGs strive for minimal market-based adaptation but
seek to establish product modularity in terms of
ecosystem platforms.
How can Born
Globals
improve their
ability to co-
evolve with
their respective
business
ecosystems over
time?
- BGs seek to co-evolve with
their respective ecosystems by
reshaping their strategies
proactively.
- BGs utilize relatively simple
strategic rules and processes
as a mean to cope with
changes and uncertainty.
- BGs co-evolve with their respective ecosystems by
reshaping their strategies both reactively and
proactively (depending on the resources available).
- The co-evolution strategy BGs features relatively
simple strategic rules and processes, flexibility,
opportunity identification and experimental learning.
- BGs may improve their co-evolution ability by
implementing multiple strategies simultaneously.
- The emphasis of ecosystem strategy should evolve
in accordance with the maturity level of the firm.
114
5.3 Revised Theoretical Framework
The empirical research has provided some significant insights on the initial research
questions ‘Does the ecosystem strategy of Born Global firms correspond to the strategy
of ecosystem niche players?’  and  ‘How can Born Globals improve their ability to co-
evolve with their respective business ecosystems over time?’ Based on the case study
and the related discussion, a revised theoretical framework illustrating the ecosystem
strategy of Born Globals can now be presented.
Basically, the preliminary theoretical framework turned out to be in line with the
empirical research findings on Born Globals. The theoretical framework of this study
consisted of two interrelated parts. In the study it was found that both case firms meet
the typical characteristics of Born Globals. In addition, their strategies were found to
correspond to the ecosystem niche player strategy, which now allows the author to
specify the preliminary theoretical framework (presented originally in section 2.3.3, p.
44-45).
Furthermore, in the empirical part it was found that some of the network relations were
highly critical to the case firms whereas the others played a less significant role in their
business. In addition, the interdependent nature of these relations came up especially in
the case of Remedy. Thus, the two-way thick and dash line arrows proved still to be a
meaningful way to illustrate the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals (in the first part of
the theoretical framework). However, in order to highlight the dissimilar strategic
importance of the network relations, the first-tier and second-tier actors in the
ecosystem are now denoted as ‘1st’ and ‘2nd’ respectively.
Some important additions should be made when revising the initial framework. On the
basis of the empirical study, the author identified certain features and focus areas to
characterize the strategy of the case firms. First, the utilization of business network was
found central in the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals as these firms seek to gain
compensatory resources from their ecosystem setting. As the second strategic focus
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area, the build of internal capabilities proved highly important. These findings allow a
more  specific  description  of  the  ecosystem  strategy  of  Born  Globals  and  can  thus  be
added to the first part of the theoretical framework.
The empirical research provided also several new insights with regard to the co-
evolution strategy of Born Globals. At a very fundamental level, the retention of focus
and following the firm’s ultimate desire was found to characterize the co-evolution of
the case firms. However, out of the strategic tools that the companies implemented
actively in order to enhance their ability to co-evolve with their ecosystem, the
following elements were identified: utilization of simple strategic rules; implementation
of both reactive and proactive actions; continuous identification of new opportunities;
strive for flexibility; management of risks (arising mainly from network dependency);
as well as seek for variation. Finally, the utilization of opportunities that still lie in a
stagnant or decreasing niche domain was found as a common feature in the co-evolution
strategies of the case companies. Thus, these sub-elements can be added to the second
part of the theoretical framework.
Figures 20 and 21 illustrate the revised theoretical framework for the ecosystem strategy
of Born Globals. The framework takes into consideration the additional findings that
arose from the empirical part of this study. The added elements are highlighted in bold
font.
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Figure 20: Revised Theoretical Framework A.
Born Global strategy in an ecosystem setting (present moment)
Figure 21: Revised Theoretical Framework B.
The co-evolution strategy of a Born Global (long-term perspective)
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6 CONCLUSION
In  this  section,  the  theoretical  premises  as  well  as  the  empirical  research  findings  are
summarized. In addition, the main contributions of this study are presented, followed by
a discussion on managerial implications and recommendations for further research.
6.1Summary
As the  original  research  problem,  this  study  aimed to  explore  whether  the  strategy  of
Born Globals correspond to the strategy of ecosystem niche players. In addition, the
purpose  was  to  investigate  how  those  firms  are  able  to  co-evolve  with  their  business
environment over time. By using case study method it was empirically validated that
business ecosystem have come to play a revolutionary role in the business of small
global firms such as these game firms. The summary findings for the original research
problem of this study are now presented.
The ecosystem strategy of small global firms correspond the strategy of ecosystem
niche players identified by Iansiti & Levien (2004a). The internal resource base,
especially employees and in-house technologies, is the ultimate source of competitive
advantage for small global game firms in the business ecosystem setting. In order to
utilize complementary resources that lie in the firm’s external environment, small global
firms implement mainly explorative strategies for resource acquisition. Generally, the
ecosystem strategy of small global firms is primarily resource driven by nature, thereby
lending support to the resource based view of the firm (RBV).
The strategy implemented by small global firms may be a rather informal in the early
phases of their business. However, their ecosystem strategy evolves towards more
structured approach along with the firm growth and maturity. Regardless the firm age,
the  personal  network  of  the  employees  plays  a  central  role  in  the  operations  of  small
global firms. In consequence, the ecosystem strategy of these companies features
deliberate investments in informal networks.
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In line with the ecosystem theories of Moore (1996) and Iansiti & Levien (2004a), the
dual role that the ecosystem plays poses major strategic considerations to small global
firms. On one hand, the ecosystem is the fundamental enabler of their existence and
provides these firms new business opportunities to tap into. On the other hand, the
ecosystem environment directs the business of small global firms and may take a
restrictive role in their operations. As a novel insight, a stagnant or decreasing niche
domain may provide the firm a hospitable market to operate in, making it unnecessary
to move rapidly towards emerging niches solely.
Importantly, the emergence of digital ecosystems has shaped the operational
environment of small global software firms radically. Previously, their operations were
strongly guided by publisher relations, making these companies suffer from weak,
irregular revenue flows. The infrastructure of digital ecosystems has allowed the firms
more stable financial standing and greater operational autonomy. At the same time, the
new setting has increased the riskiness of their business and created a call for new
organizational capabilities.
In order to co-evolve with their business ecosystem, small global firms perform both
reactive and proactive actions. The build and enhancement of internal capabilities; as
well as the ability to identify fleeting opportunities on constant basis are critical to the
ability of small global firms to co-evolve with their ecosystems. Supported by these two
means, small global firms strive also for variation: specifically, variation in terms of
product type and platforms; number of projects; as well as sources of funding help small
global firms to manage the risk relating to their operations. The interdependency
between ecosystem fellow participants is a key consideration for small firms. As a
response, the co-evolution strategy of small global firms features high degree of
organizational flexibility.
In line with the theory of Eisenhardt & Sull (2001), small global firms utilize relatively
simple strategic rules in order to deal with the rapidly evolving business environment
and the related uncertainty. By contrast, this study found only little or no support for the
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alternative strategy theories proposed by Eisendhardt & Brown (1998), Voelpel et al.
(2006) or Adner (2006).
6.2Theoretical contributions
The objective of this study was to extend the currently very limited understanding of the
ecosystem strategies of Born Globals. As a starting point for the study, several gaps in
the existing literature were identified (see section 2.3.1, p. 36), which demonstrated the
urge to examine the Born Global phenomenon more profoundly. In addition to the
extensive literature bringing together relevant theories from the fields of Born Global,
business ecosystem and strategy literature, the main contributions of this study include
 In-depth empirical research on two Finnish game companies
 The thematic network that was created for analytical purposes
 The revised theoretical framework that was finally suggested
First and foremost, this study contributes to the international business literature by
providing several new insights into the business strategy of Born Globals. Previously,
the related literature has mainly focused on the internationalization phase of these firms
and has often overlooked the considerations posed by their operational environment. In
order to broaden the scope of research, this study identified the key components that
form a basis for the formulation and implementation of the ecosystem strategy of Born
Globals. Furthermore, this study specified the strategic tools these firms utilize for
enhancing their ability to co-evolve with their respective business ecosystems. As these
topics have been yet only little examined, the findings on the ecosystem strategies of the
two case firms proved very fruitful in general. Specifically, they provide a reasonable
extension to the research work on Finnish Born Globals that has been undertaken
praiseworthily by scholars such as Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2004, 2006 and Sasi et al.
2009.
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Second, the uniqueness of this study arises from the rather unusual opportunity to
investigate the strategy of Born Globals in the long term. Although the case interviews
were conducted not until lately (i.e. during the actual research process), the author was
able to collect material that covered the entire trajectory of the case firms. Similar kind
of approach has been previously applied by scholars such as Sasi (2010) and Redwood
& Ford (2012). However, the focus on the strategic implications resulting from the
evolution of the business ecosystems makes this study highly unique. The value of the
findings arises especially from their capability to extend the current knowledge of how
the  strategy  of  Born  Globals  evolves  over  time:  while  Eisenhardt  &  Sull  (2001)
considered simple strategic rules as particularly suitable for young companies (see
section  2.2.3.2,  p.  25),  the  results  of  this  study  backs  up  their  suitability  for  Born
Globals later on too.
Third, this study lends further support to the previous research findings concerning the
importance of employees in the strategy of Born Globals. Specifically, this study
indicates that a small Finland-based company conducting global business can access
business areas outside their common reach through the personal network of the firm’s
employees. Furthermore, this study found evidence that the entrepreneur may play a
highly decisive role in the business of Born Globals. In other words, out of the typical
features of Born Globals identified by various researchers (see section 2.1.1, p. 9);
Entrepreneurial mindset and/or experience of managers (F2)  and the importance of
networks and/or personal relations (F4) seem to play a particularly significant role in
the strategy of Born Globals. As a novel finding, the founders’ ability to hunch fleeting
opportunities is proposed as a factor that may steer the ecosystem strategies of these
firms. Overall, these results contribute to narrow the gap between the Born Global and
strategy literature because they can be considered as the key dynamic capabilities of
Born Globals (for the description of dynamic capabilities; see section 2.2.3.2, p. 25).
Fourth, the theories of Moore (1996) and Iansiti & Levien (2004a) form an insightful
basis for studying the strategies of business ecosystem participants. Fundamentally, this
study validated that the core components of niche player strategies (section 2.2.3.1, p.
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22)  are  featured  by  Born  Global  firms.  In  addition,  this  study  extends  the  current
knowledge of the ecosystem strategy of a single small firm: in particular, the
proposition according which the ecosystem strategy of Born Globals should not only
follow the evolvement of their ecosystem environment but also the level of the firm’s
own maturity elaborated the current theories further. In addition, the firm’s possibility
to utilize their ecosystem interfaces as a supportive tool in their capability building
provided a novel standpoint to the existing literature.
Fifth, the findings that did not support the prior theories also provide a valuable research
contribution. Specifically, there was only little or no empirical evidence found for the
strategy theories of time pacing or purposeful organizational misfit (section 2.2.3.2, p.
25) – even though one could expect them to be advantageous in creative industries such
as gaming. Thus, this study extends the current understanding on these strategies by
indicating that time pacing or misfit strategies may be too radical or demanding for
small companies. Instead, the findings indicate that the creativity and innovativeness of
these firms is mainly fostered internally by the employees. Furthermore, on the basis of
the empirical findings, this study proposes the following important specification to be
taken into account when examining the strategies of small global firms: proactiveness as
a trait of business strategy (cf. Lewin et al. 1999; Coviello 2006; Autio et al. 2010;
Yamakawa et al. 2011; Redwood & Ford 2012) should be distinguished from the firm’s
internal proactiveness that is mainly driven by the employees.
Finally, in the literature review of this study it was found that researchers are not fully
united on whether the product strategy of Born Globals should feature market-based
adaptations or not. Thus, the following finding provides a valuable contribution to the
current Born Global research: the case firms were found to seek for minimum market
adaptation with regard to their regional (end-customer) markets. However, both firms
strived to adapt their products to multiple platforms and thereby have many variations
of their single products. Thus, the findings of this study indicate the ecosystem strategy
of  Born  Globals  to  feature  product  modularity  in  terms  of  ecosystem  platforms.  The
author hopes this contributes to clarify the on-going academic debate.
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6.3Managerial implications
On the basis of the results of this study, the following recommendations can be made to
the executives and managers of Born Global firms. The recommendations are provided
in a bullet point form because the author believes it contributes to the clarity of the
message and thereby serves the interest of the target audience (i.e. corporate
representatives) the best.
 Generally, it is critical to acknowledge the dual role the business ecosystem
plays in the operations of the firm. In order to succeed in any business
ecosystem, the strategy of the firm must take into account the fundamental
interdependency that characterise the business operations in the ecosystem
setting. In particular, the firm should seek to manage and leverage these
interdependencies in order to improve their relative network position against the
more powerful ecosystem participants.
 Firms should take note that their ability to co-evolve with business ecosystem
can be enhanced by the following means: favouring simple strategic rules;
finding a balance between reactive and proactive actions; identifying new
opportunities on constant basis; featuring flexibility especially with regard to the
firm’s internal practices; and seeking to establish variation in order to manage
the business risks.
 If the firm utilizes the business ecosystem as a source of complementary
resources, the capability to build and retain network relations should be
emphasized in the strategy of the firm. In addition, the value of more informal
relations should not be underestimated: rather, the firm should consider making
strategic investments in personal relations in order to gain additional business
benefits.
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 Whilst continuously monitoring the evolvement of the business ecosystem and
new opportunities that open up, it is important to keep in mind that the firm
should not try to pursue every possible opportunity they identify. The key
question for the management is whether the firm should keep implementing the
current practices or continue into new ecosystem environments (i.e. pursue
multiple strategies simultaneously). In order to avoid the loss of focus, Born
Globals should carefully consider whether the new initiatives fit into the
strategic scope of the firm.
 If the firm operates in the business of digital goods, the products should be
created to support multiple digital platforms. Overall, the technology cycle is
critical for the management to acknowledge: the dominant design that prevails in
the ecosystem will be eventually replaced by new technologies, which requires
organizational adaptability and certain preparedness. The flexible in-house
technology helps the firm to create platform-wise variation and thereby mitigate
the  risk  of  their  business.  In  turn,  the  actual  content  of  digital  products  should
feature minor adaptations in order to allow global scalability.
Finally, for Born Globals operating in creative industries, the influx of new ideas
appeared  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  firm.  This  is  why  these  companies  should  pay
particular attention to their capability to manage and retain talent. In seek of fostering
the organizational creativity, the firm’s internal culture and the affinity between the
employees may prove highly important.
6.4Recommendations for further research
This study contributed to filling the several research gaps that stem from three
directions - specifically, from the fields of Born Global; business ecosystem; and
strategy research. However, there is a considerable need to conduct more research on
the strategies of Born Globals in the business ecosystem setting. This study leaves room
for further investigation of many related aspects, some of which are suggested below.
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First, in order to contribute to the understanding of the differences associated with the
national context, it would be very interesting to examine case companies that originate
from another small economy. The second aspect deals with the type and number of the
case companies. This study focused on two firms with long and eventful corporate
histories. Thus, more case companies should be involved in related future studies in
order to obtain more generalizable results. Furthermore, by including also less mature
game firms in the sample, valuable insights with regard to strategies of young Born
Globals in the context of digital business ecosystems could be gained.
The case firms of this study operate in game industry. However, as the third
recommendation for further studies, it would be important to extend the scope of
research to cover other types of software businesses too. With help of cross-industry
comparison, valuable information on the generalizability of the research findings as well
as the industry-specific factors could be obtained. Finally, the findings of this study
indicated that the ability of an entrepreneur to ‘hunch’ new business opportunities may
play a very important role in the strategy of a Born Global. It would be very interesting
to conduct more research on the topic and examine how do entrepreneurs shape the
strategic direction of these companies.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 1. The case interview details and the background information of the
interviewees
Interviews
Company Source Date Location Duration Language of
the interview
Transcribed
material
Remedy
Entertainment
Oy
Matias
Myllyrinne
(CEO)
19.12.2012 Espoo 01:41:36 English 23pg.
Housemarque
Oy
Ilari
Kuittinen
(CEO)
02.01.2013 Helsinki 01:52:40 Finnish 19pg.
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Appendix 2. The Outline of the Case Interviews
1. Introductory Questions
a) Can you tell about the key persons of the firm and briefly describe their responsibilities and
background.
b) How would you describe the external operational environment of the firm?
c) Describe the nature of your relationships with suppliers, customers, competitors and other
important contacts in the firm’s network.
d) Please describe the firm’s development pattern with regard to the following aspects:
- Products & offering
- Operations strategy
- Markets
e) Thinking about the firm’s history, please identify the main challenges that you have faced
during the different stages of the firm’s development?
f) When did it become obvious that the firm seeks to target global markets?
2. Critical Resources and Capabilities
a) Please specify the most critical internal and external resources of the firm
- How have these evolved since the foundation of the firm?
b) Please specify the key capabilities of the firm.
- How have these evolved since the foundation of the firm?
- Why have they been critical?
c) How have you managed to adjust your resource base to the rapidly changing environment?
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3. Network & Environment
a) What kind of role has
- the business network
- the personal networks of key employees played in the firm’s operations over the
history?
Please describe.
b) Thinking about the development of digital ecosystems (e.g. Apple and Google),
- When did the firm discover the emergence of such ecosystems and what did they
mean to your business?
- How do you see your company’s role within such ecosystems?
- How does the future of digital ecosystems appear to you?
c) How does the firm deal with risks posed by the rapidly changing environment and
uncertainty?
d) Currently, what is the importance of digital distribution to the firm compared to the
publisher-driven model? In case the traditional distribution model is still implemented by
the company, please explain why.
4. Strategy
a) Generally, which specific characteristics of the firm’s strategy have been the most
significant enablers of your prior business performance?
b) How has the emphasis of your strategy evolved since the foundation of the firm?
c) Please explain how the external factors have affected (enabled and restricted) the strategy
you firm has been able to implement over time.
d) When a critical decision-making point occurs, what kind of matters and principles guide
the strategic decisions of the firm?
e) Does your strategy embrace multiple alternatives, variation and/or experiment of new
ideas? If yes, please explain why the firm considers them important.
f) Does the company make market-based adaptations to the products? Please explain
why/why not.
g) How is the strategy you described above implemented in practice?
- Do you have a formal procedure that you seek to follow closely or try to keep the
strategy processes relatively simple and suggestive?
h) Please evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the firm’s strategy. Why is it particularly
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suitable for your type of organization?
5. Opportunity Identification
a) How has the rapid growth of the industry impacted the firm and how have you responded?
(e.g. the level of competition)
b) Thinking about how the firm evolves with the constantly developing environment, do you
seek to establish competitiveness-enhancing initiatives unprompted or rather to take actions
as a response to the environmental changes that occur?
c) Please describe the firm’s outlook on new business opportunities. Are you moderate in
terms of entering into something new or pursue emerging opportunities aggressively?
6. Future
a) How do you see the firm’s business and development pattern in future?
b) What do you consider as the key factors that enhance your competitiveness in the rapidly
changing environment in future?
Does anything additional with regard to the relationship between your strategy and
business ecosystem come to your mind?
Is there any related material that you could distribute?
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Appendix 3. A Timeline of Housemarque Oy’s History
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Appendix 4. A Timeline of Remedy Entertainment Oy’s History
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Appendix 5. Born Global Characteristics Applied to Case Companies
Born Global
Feature
Identified
by
A parallel with the case
companies
Potential linkage
to their strategy
formulation
Global vision
Casas & Dambrauskaite, 2011;
Jolly et al. 1992;
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004;
2006;
Oviatt & McDougall, 1995
Housemarque and
Remedy targeted global
markets from the very
start
Encouraged by the
entrepreneurial
mindset of
managers.
Entrepreneurial
mindset and/or
experience
Casas & Dambrauskaite, 2011;
Laanti, et al., 2007;
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006;
Oviatt & McDougall, 1995;
Sasi & Arenius, 2008
The past undertakings of
both case firms illustrate
the entrepreneurial
mindset of  managers /
founders
Supports the
execution of
global vision.
Limited
resources
Arenius et al., 2006;
Casas & Dambrauskaite, 2011;
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006;
Oviatt & McDougall, 1995;
Sasi & Arenius, 2008
The case companies were
obtained to have suffered
from scarce resources
(especially with regard to
funding)
Need to
compensate the
limitations through
a flexible strategy
and network
utilization.
Liabilities of
newness and
foreignness
experienced by
Remedy.
The importance
of networks
and/or personal
relations
Jolly et al. 1992;
Laanti, et al., 2007;
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006;
Oviatt & McDougall, 1995;
Sasi & Arenius, 2008
Both companies highly
reliant on their business
network and ecosystem.
Personal network
important.
Interdependencies
and external
conditions to be
taken into account.
Niche operations Casas & Dambrauskaite, 2011;
Dunning & Wymbs, 2001
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004;
2006; Rennie, 1993
Niche players in digital
goods business
Need to reach the
critical mass
Unconventional
product,
operation and
marketing
strategies
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004;
2006;
Oviatt & McDougall, 1995
The internationalization
of both case companies
differed significantly
from the traditional
stages model
Strategy shaped by
resource scarcity
and niche market
needs, facilitated
by entrepreneurial
mindset
Utilization of
modern
technologies
Casas & Dambrauskaite, 2011;
Dunning & Wymbs, 2001
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2004;
2006;Oviatt & McDougall, 1995;
Rennie 1993
The in-house technology
as well as digital
ecosystem infrastructure
highly important to case
companies
Technology as an
important strategic
consideration
